Try out this Africa Quiz from the excellent Ethan Zuckerman. I’m ashamed to say that I got one wrong.
Politicians, the media, bloggers and other armchair experts on development almost all agree that aid for developing countries should be conditional on reforms by recipient countries, and that aid should be tied to conditions about how the aid is used. But this approach is generally not supported by people who work in development.
I’ve written a paper which looks at the advantages and disadvantages of conditionality. Unlike many critics of conditionality, I am broadly supportive of the policy reforms that donors recommend. But I am not at all convinced that aid conditionality is the right way to get those reforms implemented.
There are three possible arguments for conditionality:
(a) Conditions on aid might increase incentives for policy reform by developing country governments.
(b) Allocating aid to countries with good policy environments might increase the impact of aid spending.
(c) Aid conditions might increase our ability to account for how the money was used and what effects it had.
Alongside these advantages, we should consider the possible disadvantages of aid conditionality.
(a) The conditions increase transactions costs, for both the donor and especially for the recipient.
(b) Conditions may reduce predictability, which in turn reduces the effectiveness with which aid is used.
(c) There is a possibility that some of the policy prescriptions are incorrect, either because they reflect donor interests or because some of the international experts have given poor advice.
(d) The conditions may undermine internal government systems for prioritising, allocating, managing and accounting for public spending.
(e) The imposition of external conditions may contribute to poor accountability of developing country governments to their own citizens.
As set out in detail in the longer note, the arguments for conditionality are not very persuasive; but the possible adverse consequences are alarming. I conclude that aid should take the form of long-term, predictable commitments, focused on countries that are pursuing policies that are likely to benefit the poor. I support aid “selectivity” linked to long-term outcomes, which is a far cry from the current system.
You can read the full note here.
I am writing this by the fire inside this restaurant, having hiked here from Granada.
Interesting article in The Grauniad by Laura Barton who claims that 2005 has seen a decline in the monopoly control of the marketing departments of music companies:
This has been the year fans have increasingly taken music into their own hands, rejecting the over-processed diet served up by many major labels in favour of something a little more homemade. In the process they have notched up numerous high-profile successes, including Arctic Monkeys, Arcade Fire, Clap Your Hands Say Yeah, Spinto Band and Nizlopi.
It does seem to me broadly right that it is in the interest of songwriters and performers that people should be able to share music, rather as many of us did with cassette tapes many years ago.
I have no inside information about this, but I don’t think Gordon Brown will become leader of the Labour Party, or Prime Minister. My reasons are:
- the clear favourite almost never succeeds (think Gaitskell/Bevan, Foot/Healy)
- with David Cameron in charge of the Tories, the Labour Party will want someone of a younger generation
- Brown will be blamed, fairly or not, for slower economic growth and the impact of fiscal constraints in the coming years
- I suspect Blair will pick the moment of his departure to minimise Brown’s chances of succession
Who will it be instead? My guesses would be (in no particular order) David Miliband, Ruth Kelly or Douglas Alexander.
I am back in the UK, at short notice. I came for a a job interview – not because I am keen to leave California, but because this is a very good job, and one that I think I would have been very good at. Unfortunately, the interview panel did not agree, and I heard two days later that I didn’t get it. This is good news, really – as I hope it means I’ll be able to have a month or so travelling in South America with G. when she has finished her MBA and before we leave the US.
My US working visa expired, which means that I have to get a new one before I can get back to Berkeley. That is long process – two weeks at least for an interview at the US Embassy, and another week for them to return my passport. It will be longer over Christmas (or "the Holiday Season" as we say in America.) So for a 40 minute interview for a job I didn’t get, I’m going to have be away from home for about 4 weeks.
I must have been in the US too long, because A4 paper now seems a funny shape.
They call this the Departure Lounge. So called, I assume, because people sit here hastening their departure from our mortal lives, by smoking heavily, drinking early in the morning, and eating the most disgustingly unhealthy array of snacks I think I have ever seen.
My flight is delayed for at least 2 hours. It is good to be back in Europe. Not.
The G7 Finance Ministers met in London this weekend, and agreed to pilot the policy that I have been working on in my day job for the last year.
The idea is simple. Pharmaceutical companies do not have sufficient incentive to invest in making vaccines for developing countries, against diseases like malaria and HIV, nor to produce large quantities of existing vaccines for diseases such as Hepatitis B, Hib and measles. The reason is that the markets are too small, even though these vaccines would be a hugely cost-effective way to save lives in developing countries. To solve this, rich countries could offer a guarantee: if a company can develop a vaccine for a disease like malaria, we will pay for it to be bought in large quantities in developing countries. This creates strong commercial incentives for the biotech and pharmaceutical industry to accelerate the development of vaccines that will save millions of lives a year in developing countries.
This would be a new way of giving aid: focusing on global public goods; linking payment to results; and harnessing the energy and creativity of the private sector. For developing countries, it offers the prospect of access to medicines that will save lives cost-effectively. For companies, it offers larger new markets. And for donors, there is no cost unless the policy succeeds.
The finance ministers considered a report from Italian Finance Minister Guilio Tremonti which recommended that the G-7 adopt a plan that is based on proposals made in April by a Working Group convened by the Center for Global Development (CGD), in our report Making Markets for Vaccines. (Our work on this is funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation). I am proud to say that the finance ministers welcomed the idea, and decided to pilot this approach.
The communiqué from the G7 Finance Ministers says this:
We welcome Minister Tremonti’s report, published today, on Advance Market Commitments (AMCs) for vaccines. Alongside direct funding of research, AMCs could be a powerful, market-based mechanism to support research and development of vaccines for diseases which affect the poorest countries. We agree to work with others on developing a pilot AMC next year, including continued discussions with expert bodies on the diseases to be addressed.
This is a huge step forward. I am tired, and very proud of what we have achieved so far. Read more in my vaccines for development blog.
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