Two key pieces of background evidence have just been published which provide the backdrop to the discussions in Busan.  First, the Broookings Institution and my colleagues at the Center for Global Development have published an updated Quality of Official Development Assistance index (QuODA), which scores donors on the effectiveness of their aid.  Second, Publish What You Fund has published an Aid Transparency Index ranking donors according to how much information they make available about the aid they give.

CGD and Brookings Quality of Aid Index  (QuODA)

QuODA is an assessment of the quality of aid provided by 23 donor countries and more than 100 aid agencies. It uses 31 indicators grouped in four dimensions that reflect the international consensus of what constitutes high-quality aid:

• Maximizing Efficiency
• Fostering Institutions
• Reducing Burden
• Transparency and Learning

QuODA itself does not provide an overall ranking of donors.  The reason is that your view about the overall effectiveness of a donor will depend on how much weight you place on each indicator.  But for what it is worth, here is how the ranking of donors looks if you give equal weight to each of the four QuODA dimensions:

Donors may quibble about which of the indicators are important, though all the indicators reflect solid academic research and experience about what makes aid effective, embedded in the international consensus about aid effectiveness to which they have signed up.  For anyone wanting to focus on particular indicator and dimensions of effectiveness, the data are published online in an interactive web tool.

My two observations about this are:

• almost every donor has something to be proud of (nearly every donor is in the top half in at least one dimension) but all donors have considerable room for improvement;
• the multilateral agencies do better, on the whole, than the bilateral agencies; this may be because they are less susceptible to pressures from national donor politics;  the World Bank, in particular, scores extremely well across the board

The Publish What You Fund Pilot Aid Transparency Index

The PWYF Aid Transparency Index, published today, dives deeper into whether donors publish adequate information about the aid they give.  They analyze 58 organisations on 37 dimensions of transparency, mainly relating to whether information is available about particular projects and activities.

The World Bank tops the transparency index too. Indeed, there appears to be a strong correlation between aid transparency and aid effectiveness more generally.  The chart below plots the PWYF transparency scores against the average of the three dimensions of QuODA which do not relate to transparency.

This correlation between aid effectiveness and transparency could come about for three reasons:

a. common causes: well-governed and well-managed aid agencies are likely to be both more effective and more transparent;

b. effectiveness causes transparency: aid agencies that are ineffective and know it are likely to want to be secretive; agencies that are effective are likely to want to tell the world more about what they do;

c. transparency causes effectiveness: agencies that are open and transparent are less likely to make decisions to use aid ineffectively because they will be held to account by politicians and the public.

Conclusions

The good news from both the QuODA index of aid quality and the PWYF Aid Transparency index is that it is possible for donors to live up to the goals they have set themselves to make aid more effective and more transparent.  Most donors do well on some indicators, and yet are a long way behind the best on others.  The bad news is that there is a long way to go before donors overall live up to the pledges they have given.

Time will tell whether yet another conference, and yet another communique, will make any more difference to donor behaviour than have the last three. However, there does now seem to be welcome momentum towards putting more information about aid into the public domain, and we may hope that this will, over time, provide both the information and political pressure needed to make aid more effective. If Busan succeeds in giving a big push to aid transparency, that may be the biggest contribution it can make towards the ambitious goal of ‘transforming’ aid.

(h/t Ian Thorpe)

Primary school close to our house in Addis Ababa

Living in Ethiopia for the last three years, I saw aid working every day. I saw children going to school, health workers in rural villages, and food or cash preventing hunger for the poorest people.  The academic debates about aid effectiveness seem surreal when you are surrounded by tangible, visible evidence of the huge difference aid makes to people’s lives.

But on the whole the sceptics are not disputing that kids are going to school because of aid. They are asking what effect that has on the country as a whole. Does it lead to economic growth? Does it drive up the exchange rate and so damage competitiveness? Do governments become dependent on donors and so less accountable to their own citizens?  Does aid keep the bad guys in power?

It is possible that aid is effective in terms providing people with basic services, and at the same time that it is not effective at increasing economic growth.  It is even possible that aid simultaneously does short-run good (better services) and long-run harm (worse institutions).

It was this difference between perspectives which made me want to respond to the call for evidence in an investigation into aid by the Economic Affairs Select Committee of the British House of Lords. This committee, which includes some well-known economists and other public figures, is examining the ‘Economic Impact and Effectiveness of Development Aid’.

My written submission is here.  It is just six pages long. ( I’m very grateful to Stephanie Majerowicz for her help putting this together.)

The submission begins by trying to address the question of what aid is for, which seems to be the source of much of the confusion about whether aid works. Aid is often regarded as having two purposes: humanitarian aid to alleviate suffering usually in an emergency, and development aid to promote economic growth and sustained prosperity. But this is a false dichotomy: most aid falls into neither category. About two thirds of British bilateral aid is spent on improving services such as education, health, water and sanitation. This aid is not a temporary humanitarian response to an emergency, but a long-term contribution to the provision of key services and an investment in the institutions needed to provide them in the future.  The success of this aid is not best measured by whether it leads to growth in the short or medium term, but by the improvements it brings about in the quality of people’s lives.

The submission then reviews the evidence about whether aid leads to economic growth (answer: we don’t know) and whether aid improves people’s lives (answer: yes it often does).  The more interesting question is not whether aid works, but which aid works.

But there are also possible adverse effects of aid, and these are potentially serious. The submission suggests that these may be mainly a consequence of how aid is given and that they can largely be eliminated if donors give better aid. But that requires donors to overcome domestic political obstacles to reform of aid.

The evidence finishes with ten suggestions for how to make aid work better.  They are:

1. Spend more through the multilateral system
2. Make aid more predictable
3. Make aid transparent, accountable and traceable
4. Build the accountability of governments to their parliaments and citizens
5. Focus on results and use this to simplify aid
6. Invest more in global public goods, especially new technologies
7. Focus aid on people in chronic poverty, and on women and girls
8. Leverage the private sector
9. Use innovative finance to increase the productivity of aid
10. Learn more and fail safely

It is a good discipline to be concise, but it is not possible to do full justice in six pages to the nuances of these issues. I have tried address the big questions with what I hope are balanced and dispassionate judgments.  I hope you will let me know in the comments if you think I’ve got these right.

Read the full submission here.

This blog post was also published on CGD Views from the Center.

The latest edition of the Development Drums podcast is now online. It was the last one I recorded before leaving Ethiopia.

Deborah Brautigam, a scholar renowned for her work on China-Africa relations, discusses her book, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa.

There has been a lot of nervousness about China’s growing engagement in Africa, especially among traditional donors; this discussion may make you think differently.

You can listen to Development Drums on your computer at the website or download it to your MP3 player. You can also subscribe free of charge to Development Drums on iTunes.

If you enjoy Development Drums, you may also enjoy the Center for Global Development’s Global Prosperity Wonkcasts, which are shorter and snappier than Development Drums.  You can listen online, subscribe to the feed or subscribe free on iTunes.  The Guardian newspaper also has development podcasts (feed & iTunes).

Image from La Vidaid Loca

Hat tip to Stephen Jones.

There is a lot of detail below, so for busy readers here is a summary of the proposed ten steps for aid transparency.

1. Donors cannot achieve meaningful user-centred transparency just by putting project data on their websites.  Users need information which comes from many different organisations simultaneously.  Yet it is not realistic to try to maintain lots of different manually-updated databases which collate information for users. The answer is for organisations to publish online all the information they have about aid projects and programmes, in a common, reusable format, which can then be used as the basis for user-centric databases and applications. The International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) is the best chance for a generation of creating such a public infrastructure for information about aid. All donors, foundations, international organisations, NGOs and aid contractors should implement the IATI standard as the key first step to meaningful, user-centred aid transparency.

2. Any organisations which do not implement IATI voluntarily should be pushed to do so by the organisations and people who fund them. For example, official aid agencies should require every organisation to whom they give a grant or contract to implement IATI as a condition of handling public money.  Citizens should refuse to put money into a collecting tin if the charity is not implementing IATI.  Governments should consider making IATI compliance a precondition for charitable status and tax relief.  Developing country governments should make IATI compliance a precondition of local registration by international NGOs.

Google has a policy that it should eat its own dogfood

3. Donors, foundations and NGOs should ‘eat their own dogfood’ – that is, any information on their website and any analysis and data that they publish about aid should use be based on the publicly available data infrastructure.  This will give the organisations an incentive to ensure that the information they make available through IATI is up-to-date, comprehensive and accurate and that the system is fit for purpose.

4. Once donors and foundations are (a) publishing their data through IATI and (b) using IATI for their own websites and analysis, they should consider (c) helping other users, especially in developing countries, to make the best use of this information. But donors’ priority should be getting their own house in order by publishing their information in a reusable format, since this is something only they can do, and using that public data infrastructure themselves, before they help others to do so.

5. One of the highest priorities for new information about aid is that all aid spending should be classified in future according to the recipient country budget classifications as well as agreed international classifications.  The Technical Advisory Group for IATI should agree the mechanism for this as soon as possible.

6.  It seems so obvious that it shouldn’t need saying, but aid would clearly be more effective if we had more information about the future plans of donors, foundations and NGOs. Homi Kharas, in Measuring the Cost of Aid Volatility, estimates that the cost to aid recipients of historic unpredictability of committed aid flows is at least 15 percent. It could be much higher. Finance ministries, line ministries, the IMF, other donors, NGOs and the private sector would all do a better job with their money if they knew what was planned by others.  Organisations should publish whatever they know about their future aid plans, generally (with some possible exceptions such as for procurement) at the level of detail they know it.   This is likely to be the hardest part of IATI for many organisations, as few have mechanisms to keep systematic track of their forward spending plans.

7. A global system of traceability in aid, enabling money to be tracked from taxpayer to services delivered, via multiple layers of multi-donor funds, international and local NGOs and private sector contractors, is less difficult and expensive to implement than you might think.  Traceability of aid would bring about a huge step forward in efforts to make aid more effective and less prone to corruption and waste, and for building public support for aid.  Done right, it could also substantially alleviate the reporting burdens of aid recipients, NGOs and implementing agencies, and reduce donors’ costs of monitoring compliance.  Priority should be given to implementing this part of the IATI standard.

8. Donors, foundations, NGOs and implementing organisations should start recording and publishing detailed geographical information about aid projects and programmes using the newly-agreed IATI standard format for geocoding of aid, and they should require their implementing partners to do the same.

9. Some donors and agencies have defined, or are in the process of defining, their own internal standardised output indicators. Organisations should now make a big effort to reach an international agreement on a common set of standardised ouput indicators to facilitate international comparability across organisations.  This information can be reported through IATI.

10.  When we connect feedback from citizens in developing countries to a rich public data infrastructure about aid, we will have a much more realistic inderstanding of the impact and effectiveness of aid. That day  is coming sooner than most of us realise.

You will doubtless think me guilty of hyperbole when I say that the emergence of an open, international infrastructure for development information has the potential to transform the development business, much as the internet has transformed so much of our society, and for similar reason.  I’m sorry that this is an absurdly long blog post, but I hope it will convince you of the amazing opportunities which are there if we seize them.

Recap: two key themes

Two themes from my previous post are directly relevant to the next steps for aid transparency.

First, transparency needs to be centred on users, not organisations.  Only a few people are interested in the details of specific institutions. Most users want to know about all the resources and activities in their country, their sector or their community. They are mainly not very interested in the distinction between aid and other sources of finance. They want comprehensive information about resources from all organisations, whether or not it is classified as aid, so that they can monitor and influence how that money is allocated and used.  This means that it is not sufficient for each aid organisation to be individually transparent: the information has to be accessible in a form which enables users easily to see in one place comparable, consistent information from dozens of different organisations which they can add up and use.

Second, transparency should focus more on execution and not just allocation. Many parliamentarians, NGOs and academics in donor countries are primarily interested in how aid has been allocated across countries, sectors and activities. They often want to ensure that donors are living up to their promises. But in our analysis of stakeholder needs, people in developing countries repeatedly told us that they want to be able to see how money is actually being used. They want to know how much money is really arriving in their country or town; how much is taken in overheads and by whom; which organisations are contracted to provide particular services and on what terms; what outputs are produced; and what difference all this makes to people’s lives.

Organisation-centred transparency

Meaningful aid transparency cannot be achieved in the way that many aid agencies previously assumed.  While it is a welcome step forward that some aid organisations are now publishing online databases of all their aid projects and programmes, this does not meet either of the two key needs described above.  Agencies’ online project databases are an example of organisation-centred rather than user-centered transparency. As anyone knows who has tried to analyse aid spending in a particular place or sector, it is not feasible for a user to trawl through the websites of dozens of bilateral aid agencies, hundreds of multilateral agencies and thousands of NGOs, to identify the relevant activities.  Even if you could assemble all the details published by different donors, you could not create any kind of meaningful overview. Every project is described in different terms by different donors, in different currencies, languages and time-frames.  Often you can’t even tell whether donors are reporting contributions to the same project or describing different projects.  There is no way to remove double counting when money flows from one organisation to another. Nor do these project databases give us enough information about execution: they do not tell us how much money has arrived in the country, how much has been given to each subcontractor or implementing agency, or what outputs and outcomes have been achieved; and they don’t tell us anything about the agencies’ plans for future projects and programmes.

The magic database?

So user-centred transparency cannot be achieved by individual organisations putting their own project databases online, because that information cannot be aggregated across donors.  An obvious alternative is to build a database, or perhaps a few databases, to bring together comparable information from a variety of sources.

I’m writing this blog post in a café in Addis Ababa which is much frequented by ferenjis.  At the next table is Gary, a Canadian consultant who has been paid by CIDA and the World Bank on behalf of the donors to build a bespoke database of donor projects in the rural livelihoods sector in Ethiopia.  Gary has done magnificent work over the last year, visiting donor offices to collect information from each of them about what they are doing, and entering it manually into his database.  It has been an expensive exercise for donors but they already think it is has been well worth the investment to be able to have an overview of all aid-financed activities in the sector.

There are at least three other aid databases which already collect information about livelihood projects in Ethiopia. Yet Gary’s database does not draw information from any of them: he has had to construct it from scratch.  Why can’t he use the existing databases?  Because one of them is not publicly available, one publishes information with a 2 year lag, and the third was built three years ago and has not subsequently been maintained.   None of them meets exactly the needs for which Gary’s database has been designed.

Gary’s story is not unusual. There are probably other consultants like him in Ethiopia working in other development sectors, and there are hundreds more like him all across the developing world.  Donors are spending a lot of taxpayers’ money on consultants to do this kind of work again and again; and donor staff are also having to supply the same information repeatedly, in slightly different form each time, to each of these databases which one of them has commissioned.

It would be nice to think we could replace all this effort by building a small number of comprehensive and authoritative databases to meet all these different needs.  That would save everyone a lot of time and money.  But sadly it is not practical to build a one-size-fits-all database that does anything.  Any database primarily serves the perceived needs of the institution that built it, at the time it was built.

The OECD-DAC maintains the two aid databases which provide the most authoritative source of aid information.  (The DAC CRS database used to be the most comprehensive too, but in this respect it has been overtaken by AidData which contains everything in the CRS database and more).   The DAC databases were built for a particular purpose: for donors to share information with each other so that they can be held to account for meeting their promises. The DAC has never asked governments or citizens in developing countries what information they need about aid, because it is not part of their mandate to meet these needs. As a result, the DAC databases are not designed to provide even very basic information needed by developing country governments and stakeholders, such as the amount of aid which is actually spent in the recipient country, or donors’ plans for the coming year.

The introduction of country level aid management system in around fifty countries has been a welcome advance in recent years; but these too have only limited use.  They are generally designed to facilitate relationships between governments and donors, and they oftern serve this purpose perfectly well.  But there are many other important information needs which they do not serve. For example, they are not usually designed to be consistent with local budget classifications, so they cannot be used by finance ministries to support domestic budget planning.   Still less do they contain the level of detail needed by line ministries, for example to enable them to plan their activites to complement the investments made by donors.  Furthermore, the majority of country level aid management systems are not accessible by the public, so they do not meet any of the needs of parliaments, civil society, the media or individual citizens to enable them to hold governments and donors to account.

The education ministry in Cambodia told us that when they asked donors for detailed information about aid projects in the education sector many donors refused to supply the data on the grounds that they had already given a lot of aid information to the Cambodia Development Council database and they did not have sufficient resources to respond to multiple information requests. But the CDC database, which is among the best in the world for what it does, does not contain the level of detail needed by the education ministry, such as where donors planned to build schools or the type of text-books they proposed to supply.  These details were not needed by the Cambodia Development Council, and so are not included in the database, but are essential for the education ministry to manage their programmes well.

This is no criticism of the DAC database, or the aid management systems in developing countries. It just isn’t possible for a single database, either globally or for each recipient country, to meet the needs of every different stakeholder. That is why we end up with many ad-hoc databases built by consultants like Gary.   But if all those databases have to be built and maintained manually, the cost is prohibitive.

In the face of a growing proliferation of requests for data for different purposes many donors have, not unreasonably, decided they have to focus on priorities. They supply data to the DAC databases, because this is the donor club of which they are members.  They also generally supply data to the aid management systems, because these databases are clearly a priority for their partners in developing country governments.  For many donors, anything else they provide is on a ‘best endeavours’ basis – some donors do what they can to provide information in response to reasonable requests, but this manual exchange of information by fax and email, or by sneaker-net (i.e. a consultant going by taxi from one office to another) is slow, patchy and expensive.

This partial access to informatioin tends to reinforce existing power imbalances.  In 2008 civil society organisations from both donor countries and developing countries met in Accra and compared notes.  Representatives from northern NGOs reported that they generally could, with some effort and sufficient time, get information they needed from donor agencies in response to specific requests. By contrast the southern NGOs reported that when they asked donors for the same kind of information they often did not even enjoy the courtesy of a reply.

Meaningful aid transparency will occur when information is available in many different forms, in the detail and form required for particuar users, often combined with data from other sources. We can’t achieve this with a single international aid database, or a single database for each recipient country.  But if we build many separate bespoke, manually-populated databases to meet the needs of different users, we are left with a nightmare of duplicate reporting and inconsistent, incomplete and out of date databases which are too expensive and difficult to maintain.

A public data infrastructure

Fortunately there is a solution which – in common with many of the best solutions in life – lies somewhere in between.

If donors, foundations, international organisations, NGOs and implementing agencies publish all the up-to-date information they have about their aid projects, online in a common, machine-readable format, then it is possible for everyone to access that information easily, and to collate information from many sources, and to add up and compare across donors.  The reusable data format makes it possible to turn donor-centred information into user-centred information.

Once we have this information in a reusable format, any number of databases  and websites can be built quickly, and can be easily maintained.  Instead of spending a year building a database of livelihoods projects in Ethiopia, Gary could have done it in an afternoon; and the information would stay current automatically.

That is why the International Aid Transparency Initiatve is so important.  It solves the problem of turning donor-centred transparency into user-centred information. It is neither a new database, nor merely an encouragement to publish project details online.  It is an international public infrastructure for reusable data.  Donors accounting for for two thirds of global aid have now said that they will, during 2011, publish their data online in this common, reusable format.  (My former colleagues at aidinfo have done a very good short video explaining how IATI works.)

This will bring about a revolution in aid transparency.  If a country chooses not to open its aid management system to the public, that won’t be a problem any longer for citizens who want to know what is happening in their country, because it will be easy for anyone to build a copy of the database and populate it with exactly the same information from the same source.

More importantly, the creation of an international public data infrastructure for development unleashes possibilities which we could not even contemplate today. It will become easy to connect aid information to other kinds of data, such as government budgets, the distribution of poverty, or feedback from citizens.  It will unlock new analysis and insights, and allow different, less controlled, more user-centred ways of increasing accountability.

That’s why the most important step organisations can take towards meaningful aid transparency is to sign up to and implement the International Aid Transparency Initiative.  The UK has already started to publish its data in the IATI format, other donors are expected to do so in the near future.   Donors, foundations, international organisations, NGOs and private contractors should all follow suit voluntarily, or be required to do so by the people who fund them.  Government donors should make it condition of eceiving a grant or a contract that the organisation must itself implement IATI.  Bilateral agencies should not put money into an international organisation or multi-donor trust fund that does not comply with IATI.  Citizens should refuse to put money into a collecting tin unless that charity implements IATI.  And charities should not expect to continue to benefit from tax relief if they are not prepared to adhere to this international transparency standard.

Dogfooding

The raw information is not, by itself, very useful.  As well as pumping out data in a reusable format, it is right and understandable that many donors will want summarise and synthesize, to highlight key trends, draw out key lesssons, and tell their story.

As Ranil said on AidThoughts:

By all means, publish the data to allow people to interrogate it themselves. But also provide high-quality, penetrative analysis in a simple, easily understood form to support their understanding. They can always go beyond that if they wish.

I largely agree with this (notwithstanding Ranil’s suggestion to the contrary).   But I would add an important qualification: the principle of ‘dog-fooding’.

Donors should be mindful that the public increasingly expects the authorities to show rather than tell. Though most members of the public will never look at the information which underpins the summaries and narratives, they will trust the summaries more if they know that the underlying information is available for anyone who wants to check it and perhaps to construct an alternative interpretation.  So while donors should be encouraged to provide easy-to-understand analysis, they should also publish the raw data which supports it.

Furthermore, in the must-read paper Government Data and the Invisible Hand, Robinson et al from Yale proposed the following principle:

The new administration should specify that the federal government’s primary objective as an online publisher is to provide data that is easy for others to reuse, rather than to help citizens use the data in one particular way or another.  The policy route to realizing this principle is to require that federal government Web sites retrieve their published data using the same infrastructure that they have made available to the public. Such a rule incentivizes government bodies to keep this infrastructure in good working order, and ensures that private parties will have no less an opportunity to use public data than the government itself does. The rule prevents the situation, sadly typical of government Web sites today, in which governmental interest in presenting data in a particular fashion distracts from, and thereby impedes, the provision of data to users for their own purposes. [My emphasis]

This is a principle which can and should be applied to aid information.  If donor agencies were to agree that the information and analysis that they publish on their websites and elsewhere would be retrieved entirely through the publicly available IATI infrastructure, this would incentivise them to maintain their IATI data up to date and in good order; it would ensure that their analysis can be reproduced (and challenged) by others; it would increase public trust in the analysis; and it would reduce the risk of inconsistency between the summaries produced by donors and the analysis done by others.

Donors who resist the principle that they should ‘eat their own dogfood’ by using the publicly available data infrastructure for their own website and analysis have to explain why they think that the information they use is sufficiently important to be included in their analysis but should nonetheless not be publicly available for others to use.

The dogfood principle is famously practised at Google, which uses its own products internally, both before and after public release, to eliminate bugs and to make sure the organisation is always aware of the limitations of its products so that they remain focused on priorities for new features and improvements.

Helping citizens to use data

The Robinson et al paper quoted above argues that priority for government should be to publish reusable data, rather than to help citizens to use data in a particular way.

Perhaps it is reasonable to expect that the wealthy, educated citizens of America, supported by the technology of Silicon Valley, will be able to interpret and government data.  But is it sensible to expect that citizens, civil society organisations and parliamentarians in developing countries will be able to do the same?

Here’s Ranil again:

In recipient countries, both civil society and the Government needs to be helped to use the data available to work out how far the aid received in total and from each country deviates from their needs, and this again needs to be backed by a real form of accountability – and this is the hardest part of all.

I agree with this, of course.  The publication of raw data is no use unless citizens and their representatives are able to use it and to exercise real accountability over their governments, donors and service providers.  This will require investment in tools and technology and in capacity and skills, and we should expect a period of only partial success while we learn what works.

Perhaps I am more optimistic than other people because I believe that, once there is an infrastructure of publicly available reusable data, people will work out to use it.  I have a great deal of confidence in the energy and capacity of people in developing countries to sieze the opportunities of freedom when they can.

Perhaps I am too cynical in observing that many of the people – and Ranil is an exception to this generalisation – who argue most passionately for donor funding of capacity building and pilot projects and the like are also people who might expect to secure lucrative contracts from such efforts.

My anxiety about putting donors under too much pressure to focus on this is that it may reduce the priority that donors give to what only they can do, namely making available up-to-date, disaggregated, comparable, information about their aid projects.   If a donor doesn’t fund work supporting civil society groups to use aid information, then someone else can fill that gap.  But if a donor doesn’t make their information publicly available in a reusable format, nobody else can do it for them.

Furthermore, the most valuable contribution that donors can make to making it possible for citizens to use aid information is to reduce the costs of accessing and using it, by making the reusable data easily and cheaply accessible.   A modest investment which sharply brings down the costs for everyone of accessing data will have a much higher return than spending the same money enabling one particular group to assemble and use information for a particular purpose.

This means that I am in favour of encouraging donors to do what they can, with funding and expertise, to enable people to use aid information to increase accountability and so improve services; but I think it is a lower priority for donors than getting a comprehensive public data infrastructure working properly.

This means that donors should:

a. First, implement the International Aid Transparency Initiative so that there is as much information as possible freely available and meaningfully accessible to everyone;

b. Then use exclusively that public data infrastructure for their own websites, analysis and publications (the dogfood principle); this will create incentives for donors to ensure that the public information is up-to-date, comprehensive and accurate;

c. Then – and only then – invest in helping citizens to use the information in different ways.

This is a lexicographic ordering of obligations, meaning that no item on the list should be considered until the obligations above it have been discharged in full.

I do not mean to claim that helping citizens to use the data is objectively less important than getting the data out there; but I am saying that it is less important for donors to address this, since other entites can help citizens but only donors get the data published.

Budget classifications

By putting in place a public data infrastructure for development (namely IATI) we have opened up almost limitless opportunities to make more information more accessible at little cost to donor organisations and data users.  So now let’s ask how we should use these opportunities.

A key priority must be to make sure that aid information is categorised according to local budget classifications.  This has been agreed in principle in the IATI data standard, and the IATI Technical Advisory Group has identified several possible options for how it might be implemented.   The TAG should be asked to come to an agreement quickly on this so that donors can make it happen.  (The reasons why it is essential to be able to read aid information alongside national budget information were were set out in my earlier post so I won’t repeat them here.)

Information about planned future aid

The DAC databases are designed to keep track of what donors have spent, rather than future plans, reflecting their primary role of allowing donors to hold each other to account for keeping their promises.  Country aid management systems usually have more forward-looking information, reflecting their function as supporting the dialogue between government and donors.  But the forward looking information they contain is frequently patchy and incomplete.

Homi Kharas, in Measuring the Cost of Aid Volatility, estimates that the cost to aid recipients of historic unpredictability of committed aid flows is 15 percent.  Finance ministries, line ministries, the IMF, other donors, NGOs and the private sector would all do a better job with their money if they knew what was planned by others.   It seems so obvious that it is scarcely worth saying, but it is preposterous that a government cannot make an informed decision about where to supply new water points because they don’t know where donors and NGOs are already planning to provide services.  Lack of information about current and future aid spending leads to duplication and overlap in some places, and woefully under-served communities elsewhere.  We miss the synergy of complementary investments (investment in agriculture together with rural feeder roads, for example), and we create uncertainty for the private sector.

Furthermore, for people in developing countries, know what donors are doing and planning to do is a critical first step in injecting some local accountability.  The people we spoke to were not mainly interested in the past: they wanted to be able to find out what is planned and how they can become involved.

This is a challenge for many donors, for two main reasons.  First, aid projects often don’t get into their systems until they are into the implementation stage and beginning to disburse.  Before that, plans are often held as less structured information – such as in planning documents or email exchanges, and these plans are rarely collected into a central repository.  Finding a way to get this information systematically into IATI is therefore a non trivial task.

Second, some donors are worried about saying too much about their plans until they have considered their options in some detail, secured high-level or political approval within the agency, obtained approval from legislators who must appropriate the funds, and reached an agreement with the host country.  Donors do not want to announce the budget for a project before they put it out to tender,  as they don’t want the bids to congregate around the budget ceiling.

Neither of these problems is insurmountable, and given the importance of forward looking information we should aim to make it a priority to address them.  Concerns about pre-empting the decisions of the legislature seems to be a case of inventing obstacles (it is easy to include disclaimers, and governments talk about future spending plans all the time).  The genuinely hard problem is logistical: most donors don’t have much of this information is a reusable form.

The IATI mechanism is designed to enable users to collate information from many different sources.  This may be the solution for some organisations who do not keep forward looking information in their management information system.  These organisations may find it most practical to publish information about actual spending from their central finance system, while decentraliszing publication of planned spending to country offices or embassies.

The people and organisations who want information about future aid plans – such as developing country partners, NGOs and civil society organisations in developing countries – are not the most powerful stakeholders, and so it is no surprise that our existing systems are not designed to meet these needs.   Our systems are mainly designed to record and report past spending, because that is what donor countries have decided to monitor, and that is what they need to report to parliaments and auditors.

Organisations should adopt the principle (proposed to us by a statistician from a donor aid agency) that ‘if anyone knows it, everyone should know it’.  Though this is the part of the agenda that may require the most administrative change,  the benefits of sharing forward looking information are potentially huge.

Traceability

This is a simplified diagram by Homi Kharas of how aid flows. There are many more layers than depicted here.

When courier companies introduced barcode systems to track envelopes and parcels, they faced non-trivial implementation costs, but the savings have been enormous.   Barcode scanning has replaced a lot of manual recording, so streamlining administration, and has enabled companies to trace missing items easily.  It has provided management information to identify bottlenecks and so drive performance improvements. It has hugely reduced the companies’ customer support costs, since customers can see for themselves where packages have reached through self-service websites.  Perhaps more importantly, the fact that customers can track packages themselves has increased customer trust in courier companies, and some larger customers have integrated the tracking information from their courier company into their own management information systems.

A system of aid traceability is technically feasible, and while the implementation costs would not be negligible, the savings would be huge.  There is a placeholder for such a mechanism in the IATI standard waiting to be fleshed out.  My view is that this should be a very high priority.

How would it work? The underlying design principle is that each organisation disbursing money would report the details of its spending and that this would include the transaction identifier (or identifiers) corresponding to the source of funds for that spending.  For example, a multi-donor trust fund would publish each item of spending and include an attribution of that particular expenditure to the fund’s various income from donors.  Some spending would be linked to particular grant (e.g. where a donor had made a grant to the trust fund for a particular purpose), and other spending would be attributed pro-rata to various general sources of funding.

Once implemented, a system of traceability would not be a significant burden on aid recipients and implementing agencies. Each organisation and agency would be asked to publish information it already has: the source of the money it spends. If this is done consistently and the data published through IATI, it would enable any stakeholder to cumulate the information across the aid system and so obtain an overall picture of where aid is actually going.  It would be possible for the first time to trace money from taxpayer, through donor agencies, trusts funds, NGOs, governments and private contractors to implementation on the ground.  It will become possible to compare overhead costs and margins, to see whether supply chains are unnecessarily long, and to establish how much money actually reaches the intended destination.

The same traceability standard would also solve completely the problem of checking whether donors are living up to their multiple spending pledges on aid – for example to create new sources of finance for climate change.  (I’m largely hostile to these spending pledges, but that is a different matter.)  All a donor would need to do is designate each spending pledge as a different “source” of their money, and it would then be possible for anyone easily to trace whether each donor had in fact spent the money they promised and to see what had eventually happened to it.  This is a much simpler and more effective solution to ensuring that spending pledges are kept than the leading alternative, which is to set up brand new global funds for the sole purpose of enabling the money to be accounted for separately.  Traceability is a much cheaper, more efficient way to track spending pledges and prevent double counting.

Indeed, a standard for traceability could greatly simplify aid management and reduce the bureaucratic burdens of the aid system.  Intermediary organisations already have to provide information in considerable detail to their donors, to enable the funders to see how the money has been used and whether it has been spent in accordance with various constraints.  An NGO might have to comply with a rule from one funder its money is not used to finance capital equipment, and a different rule from a different funder that the grant is not used to finance travel to and from the United States.  (This is a real life example.)  So all organisations in receipt of grants or contracts are already having to apportion their spending across various sources of income so that they can show they have complied with the different obligations imposed upon them in grant agreements and conracts.  Traceability would greatly simplify reporting by NGOs and implementing organisations. Instead of manually completing forms and spreadsheets for each funder, they would simply publish the details of their spending electronicallly, with all their spending attributed to particular sources of income.  Donors would be able to access the information electronically through the IATI data infrastructure to confirm that their particular grants or payments were being used by grantees and contractors in the agreed way.  This would both simplify and streamline reporting by NGOs, contractors and other implementing agents, and streamline compliance monitoring by donors.

A system of tracability would also eliminate double counting by implementing agents.  I know a former MP from Mozambique who was asked to officiate at three separate opening ceremonies for the same school in his constituency, each with a different donor as the guest of honour to view the school for which – according to the invitation – they  had paid. Each donor was able to report to its headquarters that the money had been properly used for the purpose intended, and the result was this new school.

This scam is widespread in the aid industry and without traceability there is nothing in the system which prevents it.   Traceability would make transparent where administration overheads are too high.  It would show which organisations are not disbursing money, whether through incompetence or graft, and it would narrow the scope for corruption and waste.

The system of traceability proposed here would not require a central database or a complicated new set of reporting requirements.  All that is needed is that  implementing agents should have to identify the source of each transaction in a consistent way.  Donors could simply require this in their contracts and grant agreements.  Far from adding to the workload of NGOs and contractors, such a system could greatly reduce reporting and bureaucracy. And the IATI information infrastructure is ideallly suited to enabling these fragments of information reported by many different decentralised organisations, each individually meaningless, to be added up into a overall picture which is not only useful but potentially game-changing.

Geographical coding

The Ethiopian Government – one of the poorest countries in the world – has a GIS database of all the public health facilities in the country.  But there is no equivalent information about the location of health facilities provided by donors and NGOs.

World Bank health projects in Kenya overlaid on a map of poverty levels

The technology for geographical coding has changed out of all recognition in the last few years.  Everyone with a smartphone has the technology in their pocket to record the location of a piece of a school, a well or a clinic and to add it automatically to a database.

When aid projects in Nepal were geocoded, and then compared with a map of where poverty is most acute, the donors and government found there was no correlation. The aid projects were all concentrated around the offices of the NGOs and along the tarmac roads, far away from the people living remotely in mountains whose need is greatest.

AidData has a very useful summary of the benefits of geocoding and mapping.  More and more donors are seeing its value. I’m told that when the US Embassy in Yemen geocoded its projects it rapidly found that this was the framework they used most often for planning and mointoring their aid.  The Gates Foundation has similarly found it useful to geocode all its agricultural projects.  Yet neither organisation has chosen to publish this geographical information for others to use. The World Bank, working with AidData, has geocoded all of its active projects and made this information publicly available (see http://geo.worldbank.org/).   Their Mapping for Results programme is at the forefront in the development industry.  (I thought I saw a recent announcment by the US Government that it was moving to geocoding in ten pilot countries, but I can’t find any trace of that now.)

This is an example of increasingn returns to information.  The addition of geographical information to aid data enormously increases the value of the information that is already being collected.  Geographical information offers one of the most useful and intuitive way of organising information, and opens the way to new platforms for information sharing and gathering.

It is important that as more and more donors move to geocoding information, they do so in a consistent way.  That will increase the value of the information, and reduce the burdens on implementing organisations who will otherwise find themselves having to report the same information in multiple formats.  The IATI standard does not yet include a requirement to geocode data, but it does set out a common format for voluntarily doing so.

An important step towards meaningful aid transparency would be an agreement among all donors, NGOs, and implementing agencies to geocode all their activities from now on, and to publish that information through the IATI infrastructure.

Outputs and outcomes

The discussion so far has been mainly about spending, and the need to keep track of how money is spent.  But none of us thinks that is what is ultimately important. What we all really care about is what outputs are produced as a result of all this and what difference they make to people’s lives.

Some donor agencies have realised that it is very helpful to have standardised measures of outputs within their organisation. This enables them to compare performance across projects and programmes, and so learn what works best.  It enables them to identify wasteful or expensive programmes and put more aid into the most effective programmes.  It enables agencies to estimate totals of the outputs which their work is supporting across the world, which is useful as part of their accountability to taxpayers.

When the World Bank looked at the different ways it was measuring its textbook programmes, it found a vast range of different output measures (including, in one case, a text project whose outputs was specified in metric tonnes).   When one bilateral agency put together comparable measures of textbooks purchased by different programmes in different countries, it found that the difference in unit costs between the cheapest and the most expensive programmes was substantial – a discrepency of two orders of magnitude which could not be explained by differences of circumstance between the countries.  (Sadly this analysis was never published.)   We can only make these comparisons when we standardise measures of outputs.  In practice the process of arriving at standardised indicators has been fairly boring, but they have not been particularly difficult to implement.

Common output measures would be even more useful if they were standardised internationally across aid agencies. Then we could compare the cost effectiveness of different international organisations, including comparing bilateral donors, development banks and NGOs.   We could learn not only within aid agencies, but between them.

Internationally comparable output measures is, in my view, the most important step on the road to a sensible division of labour in the aid industry.   Specialisation will only increase the productivity of the system if organisations specialise in what they are good at, and we can’t know that until we have comparable measures of their cost-effectiveness.  When it is apparent to everyone how much it costs for different organisations to provide the same outputs, there will be public pressure on the worst-performing organisations either to raise their game or to focus instead on the things which they can do better.

There are inevitably squeals of protest from the aid industry about all this.  In part this is the modern equivalent of political pressure which led to the Calico Acts: vested interests resisting any kind of competition which might undermine their privileged position. Competition reduces the producer surplus, so you should expect incumbent producers to resist it.

But there are more creditable worries about introducing standardised output measures: that they may push donors to funding what can be measured rather than what is important, or that they will undermine the principle of country ownership by defining a rigid, global idea of what is ‘good’ in development.

I don’t find either objection persuasive.

I have no difficulty accepting that there many activities in development which have rather diffuse, difficult to measure and unpredictable benefits which are nonetheless worth doing because the potential benefits are large – I have, after all, spent the last three years of my life promoting aid transparency, which is an example of just such an activity.  But I don’t think the advocates of spending part of the aid budget in these ways should expect to be funded without having to make a robust case.  If we have good measures of the benefits of alternative uses of aid – such as vaccinating children – then someone who thinks that aid should be spent on capacity building or public sector reform should produce the evidence and analysis which justifies their view.   We should not be subject to levelling down, in which we refuse to do the best we can to quantify outputs whenever possible on the grounds that it might make other kinds of investment look relatively less attractive.

Nor do I believe that standardised output measures will undermine country ownership.  Aid donors already require recipients to provide a raft of information which they say they need for their domestic accountability.  Recipient governments, NGOs and implementing agencies would be overjoyed if donors could get their act together and ask for reports on the same, rather than slightly different, measures of output.

Some donors have shown that they understand this by moving to internal standardised output indicators. Before they become too attached to these, they should make a big effort to get international agreement to a common set of indicators which they are all willing to use. This would be a big step forward towards meaningful aid transparency, especially for those people whose primary interest is in understanding what aid achieves, and not simply in tracking how it is spent.

Citizen feedback

The aid industry has relied for too long on monitoring and evaluation by so-called experts, brought in from donor countries to conduct stakeholder interviews and review logframes.  The real experts on whether an aid programme is working are the people who are supposed to be benefiting from it.

Can we link information about public services to the aid programmes which funded them?

As we implement a public data infrastructure for aid, one of the most exciting new possiblities is that this will help us to find out, for the first time, information from citizens about their experiences of how aid is used and their priorities for the future.

The Maji Matone (‘Raising the Water Pressure’) programme in Tanzania  enables  citizens to use their mobile phones to give feedback on the state of rural water supply. The information is then forwarded to the relevant government authorities – thus enabling them to respond quickly – as well as to the media.  This kind of feedback is a great way to improve public services in developing countries.  But it will do nothing to improve the quality of aid unless this feedback about services can also be linked back to the specific aid programmes that supported those services.  If the information coming from Maji Matone about which water points are working can be mashed up with information coming from donors about which of those water points they paid for, then we can find out which donors’ provide the most useful and functioning water points.  It is ironic that the part of this jigsaw that is missing is not real-time  feedback from rural water point users in Tanzania, but the necessary information from donors to connect that feedback to their aid programmes, despite the money and technology at their disposal.  When donors move ahead with detailed geocoding, and publishiing that information through IATI, a big part of this problem will be solved.

The examples so far – from crowdsourcing in disaster relief to citizen report cards in health clinics – suggest that when citizens are able to get engaged, the benefits can be enormous.

A public data infrastructure for aid creates a platform which makes this possible on a large scale. Together with with growing access to mobile phones and the internet, it will change the power dynamics in the aid industry forever.  For the first time, it will be possible on a large scale for citizens to set priorities and give feedback about what is working in development.

Conclusions

The emergence of an open data infrastructure for development has huge potential to enable us to use aid much better.  I’ve proposed ten steps to improve that infrastructure, and to begin to take advantage of the opportunities it offers.   Here they are again, in short form:

1.  Putting a database of aid projects online does not result in user-centered, meaningful aid transparency unless the information is online in a common, machine-readable, reusable format.  Donors, foundations, international organisations, NGOs and aid contractors should implement the IATI standard.

2. Donors should require NGOs and and implementing agencies to implement the IATI standard as a condition of grants and contracts.  Citizens should demand it of charities.

3. Organisations should use the publicly available data infrastructure of IATI to power their websites and for other publications (the ‘dogfood principle’).

4. Helping citizen country citizens to use this data is important, but donors’ top priority should be getting their own data into the IATI system and using that public data infrastructure themselves.

5. Aid spending should be published categorized according to recipient country budget classifications (as well as the agreed international classifications).

6. Forward looking information about aid is administratively challenging for some donors, but hugely important.  If the donors have forward looking information then (apart from a few exceptions) they should publish it.

7. Donors should implement a global system of traceability in aid.

8. All organisations should start to record geographical information, in the agreed common format.

9. We need an international agreement on a common set of standardised ouput indicators.

10.  We need to connect feedback from citizens in developing countries to this public data infrastructure about aid.

This is a self-indulgently long essay about the importance of aid transparency, and the priorities for how it should be achieved. Busy readers may want to read the 8-point summary below.  And for a very clear and concise introduction to the importance of aid transparency, take a look at  this video by my (former) colleagues at aidinfo.

The 8-point summary

Here are what I think are the eight most important things I’ve learned in the last three years about transparency in general, and aid transparency in particular:

1. To make a difference, transparency has to be citizen-centred not donor-centred.
   Citizen-centred transparency would allow citizens of developing countries to combine and use information from many different donor agencies; and provide aid information compatible with the classifications of their own country budget.
2. Today’s ways of publishing information serve the needs of the powerful, not citizens
   Existing mechanisms for publishing aid information were designed by the powerful for the powerful. Until the aidinfo team started 3 years ago, nobody had ever done a systematic study of the information needs of all stakeholders, including citizens, parliamentarians and civil society, let alone thought about how those needs could be met.
3. People in developing countries want transparency of execution not just allocation
   There are important differences between the information requirements of people in donor countries and people in developing countries.  Current systems for aid transparency focus mainly on transparency of aid allocation, because that is what donor country stakeholders are largely interested in, and not enough on transparency of spending execution, which is of primary interest to people in developing countries.
4. Show, don’t tell
   Citizens in donor nations are increasingly sceptical of annual reports and press releases. In aid as in other public services they want to be able to see for themselves the detail of how their money is being used and what difference it is making. They increasingly expect to engaged, and are less willing to be passive funders leaving  the decisions entirely to ‘experts’. Donor agencies – whether government agencies, international organisations or NGOs – will have to adapt rapidly to become platforms for citizen engagement.
5. Transparency of aid execution will drive out waste, bureaucracy and corruption
   There is, unfortunately, quite a bit of waste, bureaucracy and corruption in the aid system.  There is good evidence that this kind of waste is rapidly reduced when the flow of money is made transparent. Corruption and waste prosper in dark places.
6. Social accountability could be Development 3.0
   The results agenda in aid agencies is currently too top down and pays too little attention to the power of bottom up information from the intended beneficiaries of aid.  Increased accountability to citizens may be the key to unlocking better service delivery, improved governance and faster development.
7. The burden of proof should be on those who advocate secrecy
   We have published a compelling business case for greater transparency, with all the uncertainties this kind of analysis entails. So where is the business case for secrecy, which would be far harder to quantify or defend?  Why does nobody even ask for it?  Why is the (inevitable) uncertainty in this kind of analysis allowed to count against the case for transparency, when the same uncertainty would deal a much greater blow against the case for secrecy?
8. Give citizens of developing countries the benefit of the doubt
   Transparency is necessary but not sufficient for more effective aid. But the fact that transparency alone will not solve every problem should not be an excuse for aid agencies to shirk their responsibilities to be transparent. Nor should we be too attentive to vested interests in the aid industry telling us that transparency is not enough. Citizens of developing countries will be more innovative and effective than some people give them credit for when we give the information they need to hold the powerful to account.

That’s the summary.  If any of that whets your appetite and you want the long version, read on.  In my next post, I’ll look at the ten steps that development organisations should take towards aid transparency.

Aid transparency: worthy but dull?

Some of my family and friends have wondered why I have devoted three years to a topic which is so utterly dull as aid transparency.  (Most of them are too polite to ask.)  The answer is that I think this matters, very profoundly, for development and for aid.

In my heart I’m a budget wonk.  I’ve worked on budgeting in the UK Treasury and in the South African Treasury. My opinions on the importance of budget systems and how they can be improved can clear a room in seconds.

King Charles I was executed because he refused to accept Parliament's right to control tax and spending

Budget accountability is not just a technical question. England fought a civil war on the issue of Parliament’s ability to control tax and spending. It is the defining characteristic of legitimate government: if the British government cannot carry its budget in Parliament, it falls.  The power of the US Congress to control spending is at the heart of the relationship between the legislature and the executive in the US balance of power. In Australia, Gough Whitlam was sacked as Prime Minister on the pretext of his failure to carry supply in the Senate.

My obsession with the technical and political importance of the budget is why I first became interested in aid transparency.

Here in Ethiopia, donors and NGOs spend more than the government raises in domestic revenues.  Yet there is no way for a member of parliament, a journalist, a civil society organization or – heaven forbid! – actual citizens to find out what foreign powers are doing in this country.

Donor behaviour makes a mockery of the idea that the heart of government is the allocation and execution of the budget.

It isn’t only a question of legitimacy and sovereignty: for anyone who has worked on public budgeting it is also a practical question of getting the maximum value for money.

For example: a friend was working for the Health Ministry in Malawi. They were trying to work out where to invest in building new community clinics. They know where their own clinics are, of course: but have no way to find out where donors and NGOs have built, or will be building, new clinics.  So there is no way for them to assess which communities do not have a clinic nearby.  In the end they had to guess.

Parliamentarians, the media and civil society need to know how much money donors are paying to governments, and on what terms, so that they hold the government to account for how that money is used. They need to know how much money is being spent by donors outside the budget process, how can they have an informed discussion about the government’s budget allocations.

My interest in aid transparency came about initially from anger at the way donors undermine budget systems in developing countries, and I am no less angry about that today. How dare we urge countries to improve their budget systems and lecture them about the efficient allocation and execution of their budget while refusing to provide them with the information they need to do so?  How dare we demand more productive public spending, while providing none of the certainty and stability they need to get the maximum value? How dare we lecture developing countries on the need to be accountable while denying citizens and Parliaments the information they need to make an informed judgment about budget allocations?

The right to information for taxpayers in donor countries

Intellectually, I understand also the idea that citizens in donor countries should have access to information about how their money is being spent.

But to be honest, until recently I found it difficult to be motivated by this. It just never grabbed me emotionally. Foreign aid is such a pitifully small amount of money – about half of one percent of national income in most donor countries – that it didn’t seem to me a great priority for the citizens of those countries to be given a lot of information about it. And I certainly did not want to use up a big chunk of a small amount of money to answer questions from freedom of information advocates, if the consequence was that we reduced the amount of money going to people who really need it in developing countries, for example to give them access to food, water, health or education.

I’ve changed my mind about the importance of this, for three reasons.

First, I am increasingly convinced that citizens of donor countries are, in the end, the only people who can insist on aid working better.  Many of us would like aid to be accountable and responsive to the needs and interests of poor people.  But that isn’t how the power relationship works, at least not directly.  Whether we like it or not, aid will always be responsive to the people who pay for it – and that means the taxpayers of donor countries, as intermediated by their political representatives.  Fortunately, these people do genuinely want their aid to be helpful to people in poor countries, though they presently have little idea what that means in practice.  If we want aid to be more effective, we have to get information from the people in poor countries who are supposed to benefiting from aid into the hands of the citizens of donor countries showing them what is working and what is not.

Expedia gives customers comparable information compiled from many different sources.

Second, the zeitgeist in industrialised countries is changing.  Twenty years ago, citizens were happy to delegate to aid agencies and NGOs the responsibility of spending aid well, and to be told from time to time what had happened to their money.  That’s no longer true: people increasingly expect to be shown, not told, what has happened to their money, and they expect to be more involved in making choices. Information that was impossibly expensive to collect and access even a decade ago can now be published online as a matter of course, and that is what people expect from their public services.  Technology enables people to be involved in the management of their services day to day, and not just every five years.

Aid agencies in the 21^st century cannot continue to act like old-fashioned travel agents – respositories of expertise and information about options, to whom the money was given and decisions delegated. If aid agencies want to retain public trust, mandate and funding, they will have to become like Expedia – a platform on which citizens can see meaningful, comparable and reliable information and then exercise choices themselves. Unless aid agencies respond to these changing expectations, support for their work is likely to continue to decline, perhaps disastrously.

Third, the access to information movement is powerful, effective and smart. We in development have much to learn from the work they have done about the most useful ways for information to be made public, for rights to information to be asserted, and for the balance between freedom of information and privacy to be respected.  Their ideas about the need for open, reusable, mashable government data is hugely more advanced than any thinking on these issues in development circles.  (I found this paper on Government Data and the Invisible Hand especially interesting and helpful.)

Different information needs in North and South

The first thing the aidinfo team did was to pull together a comprehensive analysis of who needs aid information and what information they need.  We were surprised – indeed, a little shocked – to find that nobody had ever asked this question.

The OECD Development Assistance Committee has been collecting aid statistics for five decades, and it is the global centre of excellence on aid information. But they have a specific mandate: to share information among donors about donor efforts.  They have a database designed for this purpose.  But they have no mandate, capacity or resources to provide information about aid to people in developing countries. (This is not a criticism of the staff of the DAC, who carry out their task with great professionalism; it is a reflection on the nature of the way that powerful interests are able to define the priorities for transparency.)

We worked with actual and potential users of aid information in developing countries and in industrialised countries to find out, for the first time, what information they need.  We found a hugely rich and diverse set of people wanting information about aid.  You can find our case studies here.

For me, the most interesting lesson was the contrast between what we heard from people in developing countries and people in donor countries.

In donor countries, we heard much the same from everyone: they want detailed information about where aid is going.  International NGOs wanted to check whether donors had kept their promises, whether to increase aid overall or to fund particular programmes.  They wanted to highlight cases where aid had been allocated badly – for example, redirected from poor countries to more politically and commercially salient middle-income countries. Researchers and academics wanted information about allocation, mainly try to estimate the impact of that aid, or to provide evidence about the motives which drive aid allocations.   Ministers, parliamentarians and their researchers spoke despairingly of their inability to give a coherent account of where their country’s aid is going, or to show whether aid is being used for their citizens’ priorities.  All this is extremely important.

Yet none of the people we spoke to in developing countries mentioned any of this.  For people in developing countries the questions revolve around execution, not allocation, of aid programmes.  When a donor announces that they are giving aid to – say – a housing project in their country, what actually happens to the money? How is the contract tendered? How much money gets skimmed off by consultants and in donor overheads? How much money arrives in the country, and how much stays behind in the donor country?  Does any end up in the pockets of ministers and officials? Who decides what is built and where?  How much money actually gets spent on construction, how many houses get built, and where are they?

Key lesson: people from donor countries are mainly interested in aid allocation, people in developing countries are mainly interested in execution.

This difference in outlook partly reflects different experiences and expectations: people in industrialised countries tend to assume that a spending decision, once made, will actually be executed with a reasonable degree of efficiency.  That is not the assumption made by people in developing countries.  The difference in outlook also reflects different accountabilities: people in developing countries cannot hold industrialised countries to account for the choices they make about their aid priorities, but they can hold local players to account for how the money, once allocated, is used and what is delivered with it.  So that is what they want information about.

“We may be illiterate but we are not stupid”

We would like to tell you the story of $150m going up in smoke,” said the young villager. “We heard on the radio that there was going to be a reconstruction programme in our region to help us rebuild our houses after coming back from exile, and we were very pleased.”  This was the summer of 2002. The village was in a remote part of Bamiyan province, in Afghanistan’s central highlands, and several hours’ drive from the provincial capital—utterly cut off from the world. UN agencies and NGOs were rushing to provide “quick impact” projects to help Afghan citizens in the aftermath of war. $150m could have transformed the lives of the inhabitants of villages like this one.  But it was not to be, as the young man explained. “After many months, very little had happened. We may be illiterate, but we are not stupid. So we went to find out what was going on. And this is what we discovered: the money was received by an agency in Geneva, who took 20 per cent and subcontracted the job to another agency in Washington DC, who also took 20 per cent. Again it was subcontracted and another 20 per cent was taken; and this happened again when the money arrived in Kabul. By this time there was very little money left; but enough for someone to buy wood in western Iran and have it shipped by a shipping cartel owned by a provincial governor at five times the cost of regular transportation. Eventually some wooden beams reached our villages. But the beams were too large and heavy for the mud walls that we can build. So all we could do was chop them up and use them for firewood.”

Claire Lockhart, “The Failed State We’re In”, Prospect Magazine, June 2008

In donor countries we heard quite a lot about the need to hold aid organisations to account.  On this view, aid agencies and NGOs should be able to show exactly how their money is used, and for what.  Many organisations already put quite a lot of information on their websites so that their stakeholders can look at their activities in detail.

Yet from developing countries, we heard nothing at all about the need to hold individual aid agencies to account. Few people in developing countries are concerned with the performance of the World Bank, or of DFID.  They usually want to know, from all that money from whatever source, how much is likely to arrive in their community, or into their sector, and how they can influence how that money will be spent.

Many developing countries have their own aid databases. These are often developed by the planning ministry or Prime Minister’s offices. I was very surprised to learn that they are almost never designed to provide information compatible with the country’s budget system; and that most of them are not available to the public.  So while these databases are very important and useful for the purpose for which they are designed, to enable developing countries to manage their relationships with donors, they usually do not meet the information needs of important stakeholders such as finance ministries, line ministries, parliamentarians and citizens.

The aid information systems we have today reflect the interests and needs of powerful and vocal stakeholders: donors and planning ministries. They do not reflect the diverse needs of parliamentarians, civil society groups, the media and citizens.  They are donor-centred, not citizen-centred.  They do not enable users to add up information from many different donors.  They are focused on aid allocation, not the details of execution.

But we should not allow ourselves to be daunted by this diversity of needs for aid information. These are are all different perspectives on the same underlying information: namely how aid money is spent by different organisations and what it pays for.  And although this information has not been organized in a way which makes it easy to access or use, it is information that every organization has, somewhere in their systems.  After all, every aid agency and every implementing organisation knows who they have written each cheque to, and for what purpose.

Donors must resist the temptation to try to predict and prioritise these different needs. If donors try to meet all the diverse needs of all potential users of aid information, they will inevitably devote their finite resources to meeting the demands of larger and more vocal interests.  (That’s why we currently have data systems designed for sharing information between donors, and with planning ministries, but nothing to give information to parliamentarians, civil society or citizens.)

Instead of trying to serve the needs of particular users, donors should publish the underlying data in an accessible format so that everyone can access it easily and analyse it from their particular perspective.  (David Eaves has written a good article about this, set in the broader context of public information.)  Only donors can publish the information they hold: so that is what they should concentrate their scarce resources on. Once they have made the information available in an easily accessible form, many other organisations and individuals will be able to use that information to serve a variety of specific users. I’ll talk in a subsequent blog post about what this means in practice for aid transparency, and the (very welcome) progress that is being made.

Corruption, bureaucracy and waste

Lai Yahaya reckons donors agreeing to aid transparency is like turkeys voting for Christmas

At the ONE Africa Symposium on technology and transparency the other day, Lai Yahaya, one of the founders of TransparentAid, said that donors and NGOs would resist aid transparency because greater openness in aid was like turkeys voting for Christmas.

When I began working on aid transparency I thought the opposite.  I’ve seen aid making a huge difference in many developing countries, and I believed then (and believe now) that if more people could see the difference aid makes, they would be more supportive of it. I thought public support for aid would continue to atrophy, and perhaps start to hemorrhage, as long as aid agencies are not able to show the public how aid is being used.  Better communication in the form of more press releases and glossier annual reports would not be sufficient: people need to be shown, not told, what difference aid is making.  So I thought radical transparency was needed to convince a skeptical public that aid is not all lost in corruption, bureaucracy and waste.  On this view, resisting pressure for transparency would be suicide.

Living in Ethiopia over the last three years has changed my view a bit on this.  A lot of aid is hugely effective and it transforms people’s lives.  The aid-funded Protection of Basic Services scheme has enabled the government massively to scale up health and education services.  The aid-funded Productive Safety Net Programme has not ended bad harvests, but it has made the population more resilient, preventing the large-scale famines we watched on TV in the 1980s. As well as these hugely successful government-to-government aid programmes there is amazing work done by a wide range of NGOs, funded both by individual donations and from government aid budgets.

But there is a lot of garbage in the aid system too.  Donors are held up with red-tape and bureaucracy. They dump money into multi-donor trust funds which the World Bank charges a hefty fee to administer, from which money is never disbursed.  Money moves from donor to international organization to trust fund to international NGO to local NGO, minus a haircut at every stage, so funding which starts as a river becomes a stream and then just a trickle. There are appalling examples of waste.  Many of the people working for aid agencies in developing countries are hard-working and committed, but they face a constant struggle to do the right thing in the face of ludicrous demands and ineffective systems imposed on them from headquarters.

Aid is precious, and waste is egregious. In Vietnam, it took 18 months and the involvement of 150 government workers to purchase five vehicles for a donor-funded project, because of differences in procurement policies among aid agencies.

If donors and NGOs were businesses in a competitive market they would have solved these problems by now, or they would have gone bust.  International NGOs (such as Save the Children and Oxfam) would not have half a dozen different national programmes operating independently here in Ethiopia: they would have consolidated them into one local office.  Donors are trying to harmonise and improve the the division of labour between them.  Some NGOs are outstanding, some are daft and some are downright harmful.  But change is slow for donors and NGOs because, in the absence of transparency, political constraints in aid are more powerful than business imperatives.

Transparency would change the imperatives and so help drive out waste and corruption. A 1996 study of school funding in Uganda showed that only 13 percent of the school grant from central government actually reached the schools; the other 87 percent was diverted either for private gain or by district officials for intermediate layers of bureaucracy. So the Ugandan government started to announce monthly transfers of funds in national newspapers and on the radio, and required primary schools to post information on in-flows of funds. When this information was made available to parents and teachers, the flow of funds improved dramatically, from 13 percent reaching schools in 1991–95, to over 80 percent of the money reaching schools in 1999 and 2000.

I was talking to the head of a small NGO here in Addis Ababa, whose funding comes mainly from the US Government.  I explained that under the transparency we were advocating, it would be possible to see in one place all the different things that different donors are funding in Ethiopia.  She was alarmed: “But that means we won’t be able to charge different donors for the same project”, she said. I said that seemed to me an advantage rather than a shortcoming of greater aid transparency.

An MP from Mozambique told me recently that he had presided over three separate opening ceremonies of the same school in his constituency, each with a different donor as guest of honour to be shown what they had funded. If there was more public information about what aid was funding, this kind of scam would be impossible.

The aid industry is far from perfect, and for as long as there are dark corners there will be corruption, bureaucracy and waste.  Overall I believe that aid works, but we can and must do much better.  When we see the true costs of the bureaucracy of aid, the costs of duplication and proliferation, and the shocking discrepancies between good organisations and bad ones, we’ll begin to see the most wasteful practices eliminated, and do a better job of funding the successful programmes. (Incidentally, in Ethiopia I think that is likely to mean putting more money through government and rather less through NGOs).

I am an enthusiastic supporter of aid. But I no longer think that aid transparency will prove to everyone that nearly aid is all efficient.  I now accept that there is more waste, bureaucracy and corruption than I wanted to believe, and this has strengthened my view that aid transparency is absolutely necessary to help to drive that out of the system.  But, unlike Lai, I continue to believe that unless donors become more transparent, and so do a better job of driving out the bad and making more space for the good, public trust in aid will continue to decline.  It is not transparency that will bring Christmas early, but secrecy.

Knowing what works: citizen accountability

John Githongo is a member of DFID's Independent Commission for Aid Impact

There’s a fashion among aid agencies for saying that we have to do a better job of finding out what works.  This manifests itself in greater emphasis on evaluation, especially on making more use of rigorous impact evaluation such as randomized control trials.  It manifests itself as linking funding more directly to results.  The UK has introduced the Independent Commission for Aid Impact, a step which I strongly support.

I think all this is essential to making the aid system work better.  I certainly don’t agree with the whining from aid industry insiders that measurement of results is burdensome or that it distorts decision-making in an unhelpful way. (I’ll write about that separately).

But I now believe that this approach, as it is being implemented, is too top down.  We can learn a lot from rigorous impact evaluations, and we need to do many more of them.  We need independent evaluation of aid agencies.  But there is something we need just as much, if not more: to know from the users of services themselves whether those services are effective and meet their needs.  Successful companies don’t decide their strategy according to impact evaluations, they respond to their customers.

I’ve become less sceptical over time of the idea of making aid and public services more accountable to the poor. A few years ago I was concerned that this might be a combination of political correctness and wishful thinking. It is hard to do, and it doesn’t reflect the realpolitik, which is that aid is always going to be accountable to the people who pay for it.

But we have growing evidence that greater accountability can make a huge difference to the quality of public services. In a randomized controlled trial in Uganda citizens gave feedback about health clinics through report cards and civil society meetings.  In the clinics where this happened, waiting time decreased; doctor and nurse absenteeism plummeted; clinics got cleaner; and fewer drugs were stolen. Most importantly, 33% fewer children under the age of five died. Improving accountability was much more effective than more expensive alternatives, such as paying for buildings, staff and medicines.

I’m on the board of Twaweza, an initiative based in East Africa which seeks to expand opportunities through which millions of people can get information and make change happen in their own communities directly and by holding government to account. One of their partners, Uwezo, aims to improve competencies in literacy and numeracy among children aged 5-16 years old in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda by enabling parents to assess the progress of their children and increasing public accountability of education services.  Daraja is a Tanzanian NGO that aims to develop tools and encourage citizens to report waterpoint functionality in their areas. Twaweza supports Daraja to enable citizens to report which water points are working in real time, through text messaging; to share information about water point functionality to the public in accessible formats, primarily through the media; and to analyze and publicize responsiveness of the government to citizen notification.

As I’ve written elsewhere, I now believe (along with the World Bank Chief Economist for Africa) that social accountability can make services work better, and contribute to development.  The powerful combination of a growing civil society voice and changes in technology make it possible, perhaps for the first time, for poor people themselves to monitor service providers and government services.

This is a new field and the evidence base is not yet in place. The most recent and comprehensive review of the literature by Rosemary McGee and John Gaventa at IDS finds this:

…there are a number of micro level studies, especially in the service delivery and budget transparency fields. These begin to suggest that in some conditions, the initiatives can contribute to a range of positive outcomes including, for instance,

• increased state or institutional responsiveness
• lowering of corruption
• building new democratic spaces for citizen engagement
• empowering local voices

Reading this survey, my conclusions were that the evidence so far is largely circumstantial though quite persuasive, but that we know rather more about the impact of greater accountability than we know about what we can do to bring that accountability about.

Transparency and accountability

We have a lot to learn about the relationship between transparency and accountability. They are not the same thing. For one thing, transparency is not zero sum: if I make information available to one person, that does not reduce the information available to someone else. (The technical economic term for this is “non rival”.)  By contrast, accountability can be zero sum, or at least subject to trade-offs: if an organisation or service becomes more accountable to the citizens it serves, it may as a result become less accountable to other stakeholders such as the government, donors or the employees.  Till Bruckner made a similar point in a thoughtful post on the Devex blog.

We have many examples of how transparency can change power relationships and accountability. An obvious example is the publication of UK Parliamentary Expenses.  In this case, as in many others, vested interests attempted to limit the information that was published and to control the narrative. For example, MPs did not want to publish the details of the houses in respect of which they were claiming accommodation costs: they wanted to publish only the summaries of claims under each category. But it was the publication of precisely these details which led to the biggest public debate and, eventually, to criminal charges against some MPs, because it was the details which showed that some MPs were abusing the system.

If our aim is to increase the accountability of public services to the intended beneficiaries, and to drive out corruption and waste, we must be vigilant to ensure that the transparency we advocate challenges, and does not entrench, existing power relationships.  We should be sceptical when we hear that publishing the details would be ‘too much information’ to be useful, or that it would be ‘disproportionately expensive’.    These are precisely the arguments that vested interests use to try to limit transparency, to try to control the narrative, and to slow down the shift in power and accountability which greater transparency brings about.  If donor organisations claim that publishing this information is ‘too expensive’ the burden of proof should be on them to demonstrate that this is true.

I am all in favour of donor agencies summarising information to tell an accessible, compelling story about what they are achieving.  But they are not entitled to maintain monopoly control of the information. The same information should be available to everyone, to enable others to examine the evidence and to construct a competing narrative if they wish.

Our existing arrangements for publishing aid information risk reinforcing, rather than challenging, existing power relationships.  Donors provide information through the DAC databases, which are designed for donors to share information with each other about their efforts.  Less reliably, they also provide information to country-level aid management systems, which are designed to enable developing country governments to manage their relationships with donors and which are, for the most part, unpublished.  Aid transparency in the future must be designed to allows citizens and civil society groups from both donor countries and developing countries to access this information in a meaningful way, to enable them to hold both governments and donors to account.

The aid industry is falling over itself to point out that transparency by itself is not enough. For example, Duncan Green says:

Don’t just throw money at transparency and accountability initiatives and expect a revolution. Unless the domestic politics is right, especially linking state and civil society actors into accountability coalitions, it may not make that much difference.

In a technical sense, it must be true that greater transparency is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for greater accountability.  But while I do not claim that transparency alone will bring about an accountability revolution, I have a lot more confidence in the ability of people of developing countries to use information to change their own lives.

I dislike and distrust the argument we hear from the aid industry that it is not enough simply to give people access to information, for five reasons:

1. first, it is clearly the responsibility of donors to be transparent about what they do, and nobody else can publish this information for them. Donors should focus first on the parts of the problem that are their problems to solve.
2. second, the possible need for complementary interventions is used as an excuse to move slowly on transparency (on the grounds that transparency will not make a difference unless those other institutions are in place). This is a classic case of the best becoming the enemy of the good.
3. third, the burden of proof should be on those who advocate secrecy.  We have a compelling business case for transparency, despite the uncertainties.  But there is no business case for secrecy and nobody has ever asked for one.  The uncertainties would be just as great in either case, so why is the uncertainty allowed to count against transparency but not against secrecy?
4. fourth, the evidence suggests that transparency does work surprisingly well. We should give the resourceful people of developing countries the benefit of the doubt. Consider the example of transparency of school budgets in Uganda – there was no civil society capacity building programme, or any of the other stuff that NGOs say might be required, yet the amount of money reaching schools went from 13% to over 80% in a few years.  There is not yet a rich enough evidence base, but there do seem to be quite a few cases in which, once people have access to information they are able to use it to improve the services they receive without (shock! horror!) a logframe, an end-to-end theory of change or capacity building support from international NGOs.
5. fifth, this concern seems nakedly self-serving.  Much of the aid industry’s core business is “capacity building”, “linking state and civil society actors into accountability coalitions”, “stakeholder analysis”, “empowering marginalised communities”, “civil society support programmes” and so on. Just as journalists don’t like the idea of people using the internet to share information without it being intermediated by media organisations, because it undermines their sense of identity and self-worth and jeopardises their livelihoods, the aid industry doesn’t like the idea that simply giving people access to information might be enough to enable them to change their world.

I’m enthusiastic about organistions working to help communities in developing countries to access and use information as it becomes available, and especially to help them to add value to it by mixing it with information from other sources, and using it to demand better service and advocate change.  I’m proud to be on the board of Twaweza, and I think donors should allocate a modest budget to supporting this kind of work.  But I remain more optimistic than many of the vested interests in the aid business that, even if this kind of international support is not as forthcoming as they would like, transparency by itself will still make a big difference. My belief, which is supported by the (admittedly rather sketchy) evidence so far, is that once you liberate the information people will find ways to use it.

Conclusions

I’ve spent the last three years working on how greater transparency and accountability can improve the way aid works, and my thinking about these issues has changed.  In this blog post I’ve tried to explain why. We have, for the very first time, found out what information people want and what they would do with it.  We have thought about how they could get access to it. We have more and more evidence about the impact of transparency and accountability.  And more people have begun to think about this and work on it than ever before. We have, collectively, come a long way.

In a later post I’ll reflect on the (very impressive) progress that has been made on this agenda, and on the next steps.

To conclude, here is a recap of the 8 most important things I have learned:

1. To make a difference, transparency has to be citizen-centred not donor-centred.
2. Today’s ways of publishing information serve the needs of the powerful, not citizens
3. People in developing countries want transparency of execution not just allocation
4. Show, don’t tell
5. Transparency of aid execution will drive out waste, bureaucracy and corruption
6. Social accountability could be Development 3.0
7. The burden of proof should be on those who advocate secrecy
8. Give citizens of developing countries the benefit of the doubt

Development is in our national interest

It is increasingly the conventional wisdom that it is in the national interest of industrialised countries to promote development in the rest of the world. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a speech saying so a year ago at the Center for Global Development:

… development was once the province of humanitarians, charities, and governments looking to gain allies in global struggles. Today it is a strategic, economic, and moral imperative – as central to advancing American interests and solving global problems as diplomacy and defense.

The UK Foreign Secretary, William Hague, also argues that development is a key part of Britain’s strategic and security interests (for example, here and here).

We’ve come a long way over the last twenty years. In January 1991 my father, then a British High Commissioner, sent a despatch to the then Foreign Secretary in London to mark the end of his last post in Africa, arguing that it was in the UK’s national interest to pay more attention to Africa’s development.  His despatch said:

There is an overwhelming case on financial grounds alone for acting sooner rather than later, collectively, to provide the resources required for removing most of the debt burden from African countries (provided that they are committed to active economic reform), for arresting environmental degradation, and for restoring the physical and human infrastructure sufficiently to permit diversification of economic effort and its re-direction into areas that will eventually become self-financing – as well, incidentally, as making a more positive contribution to world economic activity.

At that time, the foreign policy establishment was very suspicious of any argument based on ethical or moral imperatives: it believed that foreign policy should be based on narrowly-defined national interests.  In 1980 the Brandt Report had argued that it was in our “mutual interest” to pay attention to development and inequality, but in the decade that followed Britain’s aid programme, and our attention to developing countries, had declined.  Twenty years ago, when my father was making a case for paying more attention to development based on our national interest as well as our values and moral obligations, his view was regarded as so subversive that the foreign office limited the circulation of the despatch. Today it is received wisdom which is regularly the basis of speeches by the US Secretary of State and the British Foreign Secretary.

We should celebrate the fact that there is, belatedly, recognition among policymakers that promoting development is in our national interest, as well as being the right thing to do.  But I am concerned that we are letting the pendulum swing too far, by placing this argument at the centre of the public case for aid.  We should use every argument at our disposal for doing the right thing, of course; but if we focus too much on aid being in our national interest, we are danger of undermining the effectiveness of aid and of failing to address the real concerns of sceptical citizens.

The nature of public doubts about aid

If I had a nickel for every time someone said to me, “I don’t think we should spend money helping starving people because I don’t give a toss about them,” I wouldn’t have any nickels at all.

The foreign policy establishment may have been sceptical about focusing on the ethical dimension of foreign policy, but the public never was.  Neither the British nor the American people lack compassion for their fellow human beings.  My father’s prescient efforts to awaken policymakers’ interest in development were made several years after Live Aid, which had showed that the public needs no lessons in generosity.

I readily concede that the public is often sceptical about aid. I have witnessed focus group discussions which anybody who is interested in development would find alarming, anyway at first. In such a discussion, the person who says “charity begins at home” will initially get lots of support. But as the discussion goes deeper, it turns out that they are sceptical not because of any indifference to the plight of others, but because they are not convinced that aid works. In many such groups you’ll hear Bauer’s famous remark that aid is “poor people from rich countries giving money to rich people from poor countries.” Many people are worried that aid ends up in the Swiss bank accounts of despots and dictators, or of corrupt consulting and construction firms.  Yet when the same focus groups are given evidence of the benefits of particular aid programmes, their mood changes sharply, and they soon ask: “Why don’t we give more aid like that?”

The idea that “charity begins at home” clearly resonates with many people.  In part the phrase expresses the idea that we have stronger social ties and obligations to people who live in our neighbourhood than we do to people on the other side of the world.  But few people really believe, on reflection, that we should pay no heed to people dying of hunger or for lack of medical facilities just because they are far away.  Perhaps “charity begins at home” resonates for another reason: we can observe at first hand whether the effort we make to help our family and neighbours is actually working, whereas with foreign aid we can’t, and we have a sneaking suspicion that this means that it isn’t.

The most popular critique of aid in recent years, Dead Aid by Dambisa Moyo, does not challenge aid on the grounds that the plight of the poor is not our concern. It is a poorly argued book in many other respects, but it would be wrong to accuse Dr Moyo of callous indifference. Indeed, all the famous aid sceptics, from P. T. Bauer to Bill Easterly, explicitly accept development as the objective: they simply question whether foreign aid is a good way to achieve it.

The dangers of relying on national interest

So perhaps the public does not need to be persuaded that development matters, but needs instead to be convinced that aid makes a difference.  Even so, it seems reasonable to say that we should use every argument at our disposal for aid: we should appeal to the public’s self-interest as well as their moral values, and we should at the same time set out the evidence that aid works.

But there are two big risks to this approach which should lead us to think carefully about the balance of how we make the argument.

First, if we promote aid principally on the grounds that it supports our security and commercial interests, we should not be surprised when people expect that this is how aid should be used.

In the long term our national interest coincides with our moral urge to promote development and to reduce poverty.  But in the short term there is often a trade-off between development and poverty reduction on the one hand, and our commercial, security and strategic interests on the other.

During the Cold War a huge amount of aid was wasted currying favour with despots for geo-strategic reasons and accordingly propping up failing industries and businesses.  Even today, less than 40% of aid is spent in the poorest countries.  This makes a kind of sense if your aim is to increase your influence in emerging economies and in fragile states like Pakistan and Iraq.  There are many poor people in these countries, but all the evidence suggests that these are not the places in which aid is most needed and can do the most good.  A significant portion of aid (though none of the UK’s aid) is still tied to firms in donor nations. This makes sense if the aim is to support the donor’s commercial interests but not if the aim is to have the greatest possible impact on the reduction of poverty.  It is legitimate and proper for donors to want credit for their aid, to enhance both their international reputation and their image and influence in the recipient country. But this goal leads donors to give too much aid through bilateral aid programmes, on which their national flag can be stamped, and too little through more efficient multilateral institutions and other shared funds, resulting in unnecessary duplication, overheads and transaction costs.

We do not have institutions that can protect our long-term national interest in development and poverty reduction from the pressures to use aid to pursue these short-term strategic, security and commercial interests.  In a world of short time horizons, our immediate interests tend to prevail over our longer-term goals.  So the more we justify aid chiefly on the grounds of national interest, the greater the danger that our short-term national interest will dictate the way aid is used, with negative consequences for the effectiveness of aid and for our longer-term interest in poverty reduction.

If the public were unsure whether they cared enough about global development to give aid, then it might be worth deploying aid in ways which are most obviously in the national interest, even if that required sacrificing some of its effectiveness.  (For many years, the Danish government justified tying aid to Danish suppliers on precisely these grounds.)  But if the public is already convinced that development is important, and their doubt is primarily about whether aid is effective, then it makes no sense to use aid in less effective ways in an effort to win greater public approval.

The second reason why we should be cautious about focusing too much on our national interest when justifying aid is that we are in danger of setting ourselves up to fail.

Take an example which is, literally, close to home for me. School enrolment here in Ethiopia has risen from a quarter of all children fifteen years ago to more than four fifths of children today. About a third of Ethiopian children – 8 million boys and girls – are at school as a direct result of foreign aid.  My house in Addis Ababa is a few hundred metres from the local primary school, so I see boys and girls going past my window to school every day.

If the British public could see as I do how their aid money is being used, they would, like me, be encouraged and touched by the good that aid does.  This is a direct, demonstrable benefit of aid, and one which appeals to the British sense of justice and empathy for our fellow human beings.   It would soften the heart of the hardest sceptic.

Kids going to school near my house in Addis Ababa. A third of Ethiopia's education system is financed by aid.

Why then is there such widespread doubt that aid works?  In part it is because people at home cannot look out of their window and see it working.  But it is also because we have made extravagant claims about what aid will do. Even if it is true that aid leads to faster economic development, and that it thereby reduces the risk of global health contagions, organised crime and drug smuggling, this would be impossible to demonstrate statistically.  (It would be like trying to show that the EU has prevented war in Western Europe since 1945: plausible, very probably true, but unprovable.)

People are right to be doubtful about the validity of some of the more grandiose claims for what aid can achieve.  Perhaps it seems too modest to say that we pay for millions of children to go to school, and for people to have access to clean water and basic health care. But this is a reality which we can prove beyond any doubt; and for most taxpayers it will seem well worth the modest amount of money we spend on it.  And it is probable, even if unprovable, that all this works in favour of our own long-term interests as well.

The public and the politicians who represent them will inevitably devote only a modest amount of time to thinking about development.  If we use up scarce bandwidth making an argument with which few disagree – that poverty matters – we waste the opportunity to make the argument of which they are yet to be convinced: that development policy and aid can and do make an important difference to the lives of the poor.

The aid that was used to prop up Mobutu in Zaire during the Cold War may have served a foreign policy interest, but it did little or nothing to reduce poverty and raise living standards in that country.   Money used today to buy food aid may be a convenient subsidy for American and European farmers but if we bought the food locally we could feed twice as many people with the same money and at the same time support the growth of sustainable agriculture in developing countries. The more we use aid to support our strategic and commercial interests, the less effective that aid is likely to be in the fight against global poverty, in which we have an important long-term interest.

It is in our national interest to see faster development and the end of global poverty, and we should not be shy about saying so.   But we should think twice before using this as the central plank of the case for more effective development policies and more aid.  People do not need to be persuaded to care about global poverty: they do need to be convinced that there is something we can do about it.  Just reminding them that it is in our national interest to promote development fundamentally misses the point.  The more we defend aid mainly on the basis that it is in our national interest, the more likely it is to be bent to our short-term commercial and strategic interests, the more ineffectively it will be used, the harder it will be to demonstrate its benefits, and the greater the justification for public scepticism.  Give the public some credit: they don’t need to be persuaded to care about poverty.  Aid does work:  and the first and most pressing task is to demonstrate to the public with persuasive evidence that this is so.

Max cites a forthcoming paper by Andrew Dorward and Ephraim Chirwa (ungated version here).  Dorward and Chirwa argue that:

Malawi’s agricultural input subsidy programme addresses a low maize productivity trap that leads to food insecurity and poverty, and constrains economic growth and, paradoxically, diversification out of maize and agriculture. This low productivity trap arises as a result of severe seasonal credit constraints affecting very large numbers of poor, food deficit farming families, together with thin and high risk, high margin input and maize markets. The key successes of Malawi’s subsidy programme arise where it relieves both affordability and profitability constraints to increased staple crop productivity from increased input use, and in doing this both raises land and labour productivity and improves food security for large numbers of poor households through some combination of increased real wages and reduced food prices.

The only part of Max’s post that I disagree with is his remark that  ”we should leave our economic theory at the door and instead focus on what works empirically.”  As Jonathan points out in the comments, economic theory tells us that government intervention may be an appropriate response to market failures.  While recognising the success of the programme so far, we should not stop asking whether the same results could be achieved more cheaply and more sustainably with some other, even better approach.

A more relevant challenge is: why did some donors oppose this programme, and what have we (and they) learned from that error?

Dr Bingu wa Mutharika fought and won the 2004 election on a platform of guaranteeing food security. HIs proposals for a targeted subsidy was overturned by the Malawi Parliament in favour of a universal subsidy, which was introduced in 2005.

Election Poster for Bingu wa Mutharika

Donors are – on paper – committed to respecting government ownership and supporting the governments’ development programme.  Yet despite clear national commitment, endorsed in a democratic election, donors generally opposed the introduction of fertilizer subsidies, consistent with the World Bank’s position throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The donors argued against the government’s proposed scheme because they thought it would be too expensive; it was insufficiently targeted on the poor; it would undermine private sector development; and because they doubted the capacity of the government to implement it.

When Malawi introduced its programme in 2005, the IMF and the US Government opposed it outright, on the grounds that it would damage the private sector. The World Bank, EU and UK Department for International Development adopted a more nuanced position: they argued that instead of a universal programme there should be “smart subsidies” which should be tightly targeted to reduce the costs, and that the programme should include an explicit exit strategy.  DFID eventually supported the programme after extracting an agreement from the government that it would use private fertilizer suppliers.  Some of the Scandinavian donors and UN agencies supported the programme from the outset, partly influenced by the apparent success of a local Millennium Villages Project.

The apparent success of the Malawi fertilizer subsidies is primarily a story about the Malawi government, not donors; though the scheme could not have been afforded, especially through the 2008 price hike, without donor funding.  But it does give rise to two questions about donor policy and behaviour.

First, are donors still labouring under too simplistic a view of the role of government in the economy? Donors continue to be sceptical of agricultural subsidy programmes (which is rank hypocrisy, given the subsidies they provide their own farmers).  This seems to be partly because we have an insufficiently rich analysis of the nature of the market failures and how they are best addressed; and partly because donors still suffer from the sustainability delusion, which requires them to oppose perfectly sensible government policies and programmes for which there is no identifiable exit.  If the UK government were only allowed to implement inherently time-limited policies there would be no National Health Service.

Second, how should donors reconcile their own views of a policy with their commitment to respect country ownership? Donors are committed to support developing countries’ own development strategies.   But what happens if they disagree either with the thrust of those policies, or with particular details?  Should they refuse to finance them? Should they act as “critical friends”, identifying the shortcomings of the policies and seeking to get them changed?  Should such opposition be private or public? How is that consistent with respecting country ownership? If they do try to change the policy how are they held to account when – as was apparently the case in Malawi – they are wrong?

I’d like to suggest two ways in which donors can better respect country ownership. First, where they have an opinion about a policy, they should produce publicly their analysis and evidence, to allow this view to be discussed as part of the public debate, rather than exert political and economic power behind closed doors.  Second, there should be a version of the Salisbury Convention in aid: if a government is pursuing a policy for which it has an explicit mandate in a reasonably democratic election, the donors should not try to undermine it.

UPDATE: Smart commenters below ask two questions.  First, is it premature to say this has been a success, until we have a year of bad rains?  Second, were the donors as hostile as my blog post suggests?  If you have insight into either question, please leave it in the comments below.

Go to the website of any aid agency and you’ll find a cornucopia of information about the good work that it is doing. The problem is that it doesn’t publish this information in a usable form. Visibility is not the same as transparency.

Members of the US Congress rightly complain that they cannot get a complete picture of US foreign assistance, which is delivered by 26 government agencies. As Congress has discovered, to get a complete picture of what the US is doing you need up-to-date, comprehensive data from each aid agency in a common format that enables it all to be added up, reconciled and compared. It is very welcome that the US government is putting a system in place to do this.

Now put yourself in the shoes of ministers or parliamentarians in a developing country. They face the same problem as members of Congress, writ large. Aid to their country is channelled through bilateral aid agencies, multilateral organisations and thousands of NGOs. Aid goes from one organisation to another – minus a “haircut” at each stage – before any services are provided to anyone. How can officials or MPs get useful, up-to-date, comprehensive information about all this spending and all these activities? Certainly not by trawling through thousands of separate donor websites.

Read the whole thing here.

This shift has profound implications for development policy.  It highlights the importance of ensuring that growth reduces poverty.  It raises questions for the allocation of traditional aid, and about the legitimacy and effectiveness of intervention by outsiders to influence the distribution of income within other countries.

In a new episode of Development Drums, I discuss these issues with Andy Sumner and Claire Melamed (Head of the Growth and Equity Programme at ODI).  We discuss what  the new data tell us, and what it means for aid and development policy.

You can listen to Development Drums on your computer at the website (http://developmentdrums.org) or download it (from here) to your MP3 player.  Alternatively, you can subscribe to Development Drums on iTunes free of charge (search for “Development Drums” in the iTunes store).

Shanta Devarajan asks if we have found Development 3.0

Shanta Devarajan, the World Bank Chief Economist for Africa, describes in an important new blog post the evolution of development policy in terms of changing ideas about market failures and government failures.   In the 1950s and 1960s, he says, development was about addressing market failures by providing public goods, addressing externalities, and redistributing income to poor people. Starting in the 1970s, attention shifted to government failures such as weak capacity, rent-seeking, political patronage and corruption.    Today, he says, many of the most egregious failures have been addressed, but the remaining failures directly hurt poor people.

On Shanta’s view, these failures arise from two kinds of imperfection in the public sector: that governments have difficulty monitoring and enforcing performance (leading to absentee teachers, clinics without drugs, etc) and imperfections in the political system which prevent it from serving the poor.

Shanta says that changes in technology and the rise of civil society can change all this:

Our understanding of government failure has coincided with two other developments.  One is the rise of civil society’s voice in public discourse.  The second is the technology revolution in poor countries.  There’s a message here.  Can we use technology and the voice of civil society to address these government failures?  Rather than imposing conditions, we can empower poor people to monitor service providers.  With some 80 percent of Africans having access to a cell phone, it is not difficult to have parents (or the students themselves) send an SMS message if the teacher is not in school, or there are no drugs in the clinic or the purported road maintenance program is not happening.  This could do more for helping governments and donors get value for money than all the fiduciary controls we put in place.  While we are at it, why don’t donors (including the World Bank) use technology to have the beneficiaries monitor and supervise development projects?

Can this work? Is social accountability a new model for development?

There is increasingly good evidence that transparency and accountability make a significant difference, in some cases surprisingly transformational.  There is an increasingly impressive collection of individual case studies, rigorously evaluated, which demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach.  For example, Jacob Svensson and Martina Björkman conducted a randomized field experiment in Uganda to test the effect of increasing community-based monitoring. They found that when communities more extensively monitored providers, both the quality and quantity of health services improved, including reducing infant mortality by a third.

There have, however, been no significant comparative studies bringing this evidence together.  Until now.  Rosemary McGee and John Gaventa have just published an extensive review of literature and experience across the field.  There is a lot of material to digest, but here is the core of what they find:

…there are a number of micro level studies, especially in the service delivery and budget transparency fields. These begin to suggest that in some conditions, the initiatives can contribute to a range of positive outcomes including, for instance,

• increased state or institutional responsiveness
• lowering of corruption
• building new democratic spaces for citizen engagement
• empowering local voices
• better budget utilization and better delivery of services.

Reading the study, my conclusion is that we know rather more about the impact of greater accountability than we know about what we can do to bring that accountability about.

I currently work on transparency, because I think makes an important contribution to the ability of citizens to hold governments and donors to account and so improve service delivery and accelerate poverty reduction. There have been some good examples of how this can work in practice, which are summarised in Appendix 1 of this cost benefit analysis for the International Aid Transparency Initiative (page 23 of this pdf; disclosure: I’m a co-author).  The most famous example is this study of the impact of information on funds flowing to schools in Uganda which found a strong relationship between transparency and funds flowing to schools, though the evidence was subsequently challenged.   So while there is increasingly good evidence to confirm the intuition that transparency plays an important role, we need to understand a lot better how, and in what circumstances, transparency works, and particularly to understand better what else needs to be in place.

One issue on which Shanta is clearly right is that role that technology can play in supporting greater accountability. We know that technology does not end poverty, but we are seeing more and more examples of how technology – especially mobile telephony and text – has enabled and supported changes from mobile banking to wholesale agriculture markets. Just as technology underpins changes in markets (think of newspapers, or bookselling), so it can underpin changes in political economy and social accountability.

So is this, as Shanta says, Development 3.0?

Development is a long, slow, uncertain process and the road is bumpy and winding.  Transparency and accountability are not a one bound and we are free solution, any more than the ‘big push’ or the Washington consensus which Shanta labels Development 1.0 and 2.0 respectively.  But this time there is an important difference.  The ‘big push’ and the Washington consensus were blueprints for a better world. Social accountability, by contrast, does not start with a preconceived idea of how resources should be used or services should be delivered: it seeks to change the dynamics of the system to make it more responsive and more likely to converge by itself on solutions which better serve poor people in developing countries.

A big challenge will be whether development agencies themselves are able to adapt.  Their models for project cycle management are based on a top-down view: you specify the world you are trying to create (the “goal”) and then you articulate a series of outputs and activities which you expect will bring this about.  It will be a big change – intellectually, organisationally and culturally – to modify their systems, incentives and procedures to a world in which donors work instead to help the citizens of developing countries to determine their goals and priorities and build their own systems to achieve them.

If what Shanta is calling Development 3.0 means that instead of offering a one-size fits all solution we should work to close the broken feedback loop so that communities themselves can find the answer, then I think this may indeed be a change of perspective on development worthy of a major version number.

Though the effects of aid on development are uncertain, there is a huge amount that industrialised countries can do – or not do – which affects how quickly countries develop.  The policies of rich countries on trade, investment, migration, the environment, security and technology can make a huge impact on how quickly poor countries are able to develop.

Yet we tend to judge industrialized countries too much according to how much aid they give, and too little to how they behave in all these other ways.

The Center for Global Development provides an essential service by ranking the rich each year so we can see how we are doing.  They use a series of quantitative measures on all these dimensions to create a composite picture of how a country’s policies affect development. The 2010 results are now in.

The overall rankings in the 2010 Commitment to Development Index

For people in the UK who feel smug about the UK’s approach to development, the Commitment to Development Index makes pretty sobering reading. The UK is in 16th place, out of 22 countries in the index.

The UK has fallen ten places since 2005, when it was in joint fifth place, after only Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands and Norway.

The UK is one of only three countries to have got worse rather than better since the index began in 2003. (The other two are Denmark – which started at the very top, and Switzerland.) And this isn’t a point about the change of government: Britain was 16th last year too.

Given that the UK has a relatively generous and effective aid programme, why does it come so far down the league of overall impact on development?

In short: arms exports.

The Commitment to Development Index uses three measures of a country’s security policy.  It tallies the financial and personnel contributions to internationally mandated peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions. It rewards countries that base naval fleets where they can secure sea lanes vital to international trade.  And it penalizes arms exports to undemocratic nations, on the grounds that putting weapons in the hands of despots can increase repression at home and the temptation to launch military adventures abroad.

The UK is by far the worst of the the 22 nations in the index on selling arms to poor and undemocratic governments.  UK arms exports, weighted for undemocratic and unaccountable states, are four times worse, as a share of GDP, than the next worst arms exporter, the United States.

The bars shows the scores from 2003 to 2010in each of the 7 dimensions

As well as being stand-out bottom of the pack on arms exports, the UK does badly on migration policy, because it takes too few unskilled immigrants and students for its size; and technology policy both because Government R&D spending is unduly focused on defence, and because the  UK tends to pursue intellectual property rights policies that are not in the interests of poor countries, such as allowing patents on plant varieties, and pushing to incorporate into bilateral free trade agreements “TRIPS-Plus” measures that restrict the flow of innovations to developing countries.

Critics of aid often argue that we should focus more on helping countries to develop, rather than what they call ”handouts’ to poor countries.  In that context, they usually mention the need for more open trade with developing countries.  That is certainly important. The Commitment to Development Index suggests that they should also be advocating changes in UK policy to: reduce arms sales to undemocratic countries, accept more unskilled immigrants, increase the number of foreign students, remove patents on plant varieties and stop arguing for TRIPS-plus.

The UK gets credit for its environmental policies, mainly because it has done relatively well on limiting carbon emissions and because of high petrol taxes. Global warming has a disproportionately negative impact on developing countries, so these measures have an important impact on developing countries.

Many British people are proud of the UK’s commitment to reducing poverty in developing nations, and Britain’s model of an independent development agency within Government led by a separate Cabinet Minister is widely admired.  But is it working?    Judging by the scores in the 2010 Commitment to Development Index, the UK is  doing a better job at securing and spending a rising aid budget than it is at getting the rest of government to pursue development-friendly policies.

The main conclusion is that as would-be change-makers, we should not try to design a better world: we should concentrate on building better feedback loops.

You can view and listen to the presentation by clicking the image below. This narrated presentation lasts 18 minutes (beware: as soon as you click you’ll hear my voice, so don’t do this if you are in a meeting!).

Alternatively, you can download the presentation as a pdf file here.  But this won’t make as much sense, as there are a couple of videos in the presentation.

If you like this presentation, you may also like my previous narrated presentation about aid effectiveness after Paris.

Please let me know what you think in the comments below.  Am I right that we should focus more on feedback loops?

Overall, this spending review is a seismic political event, which will be talked about for many years to come.   It will reduce planned spending by £81 billion ($130 billion) a year, and remove about half a million public sector workers from the government payroll.

In that context, the coalition government’s decision to increase international development spending is remarkable.  Here is the Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne:

I can also confirm that this Coalition Government will be the first British government in history, and the first major country in the world, to honour the United Nations commitment on international aid.  The Department for International Development’s budget will rise to £11.5 billion over the next four years.   Overseas development will reach 0.7% of national income in 2013.

This will halve the number of deaths caused by malaria. It will save the lives of 50,000 women in pregnancy and 250,000 newborn babies. Whether working behind the counter of a charity shop, or volunteering abroad, or contributing taxes to our aid budget, Britons can hold their heads up high and say – even in these difficult times, we will honour the promise we make to the very poorest in our world.

The chart below, which shows aid as a share of national income since 1960, shows that this really is historic.  Britain will, for the first time, meet the international aid target of 0.7% of national income, joining Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.

UK ODA as share of GNI since 1960

In cash terms, Britain’s official development assistance (ODA) will increase by 50% over the four years to 2014.  Most of this will continue, as now, to be channelled through the UK Department for International Development (DFID), whose budget will increase by 47% in cash terms (37% after taking account of inflation).

The increase will occur mainly in 2013, when British aid will increase by a third from £9.1bn to £12.0 bn.

To get a sense of the political priority that development has been given in this spending review, consider that the National Health Service will increase by just 1.3% in real terms over the same four years; and many government departments face reductions of 20% to 30%.

The Daily Express opposes foreign aid

This is a considerable act of political bravery on the part of the Conservative-Liberal coalition. Today’s Daily Express (see right) is among the British newspapers demanding that, in the context of a spending review in which many public services face declining budgets, aid should be cut too.

The government has defended aid on the grounds that it is both morally right, and in Britain’s interest.  They have also said that they will step up efforts to ensure that the aid budget is both transparent and effective.  Chancellor George Osborne said that the aid budget is “protected from cuts but not from scrutiny.”  The announcements included:

• A significant reduction in the admin budget.  Running costs (a definition of back-office costs used by the OECD DAC) will be reduced to 2% of total spending by 2015, half the global donor average of 4%.
• A new Independent Commission for Aid Impact will assess all ODA spending to ensure best value for money and effectiveness.
• DFID will end bilateral aid to China and Russia.

Andrew Mitchell, the Secretary of State for International Development, is quoted as saying:

We are proud of the fact that we are keeping our promise to spend 0.7% of GNI on aid. However, in the current financial climate, we have a particular duty to show that we are achieving value for money. Results, transparency and accountability will be our watchwords and will define everything we do.”

Of course, the development experts have quibbles and concerns, such as whether aid will be spent disproportionately in support of Britain’s security priorities, and how DFID will manage a fast rising aid budget while staff numbers are being reduced.  These are, in my view, reasonable questions to ask; and I will be among those continuing to ask questions about whether and how aid spending can be used most effectively; but it seems churlish today to focus on these issues rather than the big picture of a substantial demonstration of political and financial commitment to overseas aid.

The coalition government should be congratulated for their commitment to the UK’s overseas aid programme, and for their efforts to improve the transparency, accountability and effectiveness of aid to have the maximum possible impact improving the lives of people in developing countries.

For more commentary, see

• Lawrence Haddad from IDS
• Claire Melamed from ODI
• Julian Borger in the Guardian on the implications for foreign policy

Peter Gill's new book, Famine and Foreigners

Peter Gill talks on the latest Development Drums podcast about his new book, Famine and Foreigners: Ethiopia Since Live Aid.

The Ethiopian famine of 25 years ago killed more than 600,000 people. Peter Gill was the first journalist to reach the epicenter of the famine in 1984 and he returned at the time of Live Aid to research the definitive account of the disaster, A Year in the Death of Africa .

Twenty five years later, Peter Gill has returned to Ethiopia to tell the story of what has happened since then in Ethiopia. His book draws on interviews with leading Ethiopians and with foreign aid officials. He interviewed Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and the leading development economists, Joseph E. Stiglitz and Jeffrey Sachs. Most important of all, Gill has traveled throughout the country and interviewed many of Ethiopia’s citizens.

In this edition of Development Drums, I ask Peter to recall what happened in the famine of 1984, and how Ethiopia has changed in the quarter of a century that followed.

You can listen to Development Drums on your computer at the website (http://developmentdrums.org) or download it (from here) to your MP3 player.  You can subscribe to Development Drums on iTunes free of charge (search for “Development Drums” in the iTunes store).

A Social Impact Bond is a contract with the public sector in which it commits to pay for improved social outcomes. On the back of this contract, investment is raised from socially-motivated investors. This investment is used to pay for a range of interventions to improve the social outcomes. The financial returns investors receive are dependent on the degree to which outcomes improve.

This idea is being tested to pay for a project which aims to cut re-offending by prisoners in Peterborough. Here it is described in the Financial Times:

The £5m bond is being used to fund the St Giles Trust, a third-sector organisation with a record of reducing reoffending by up to 40 per cent. It engages with offenders in jail and then supports them once out – something the probation service does for those on longer sentences but not for short-term prisoners.

If St Giles fails to cut reoffending at Peterborough, investors will get nothing back. If the reoffending rate reduces by 7.5 per cent they start to get a return. As it rises, the justice ministry will pay more, up to a maximum 13.5 per cent a year.

…  The justice secretary was careful yesterday not to paint the social impact bond – “a small scheme, although I would hope to have it on a much bigger scale across the country if we can make it work” – as the big answer to that. But payment only for results would be a key part of his green paper on reducing reoffending, he said.

Kenneth Clarke talks to inmates at Peterborough prison

The logic of these bonds is that the private sector invests in schemes if they are convinced it will deliver certain kinds of results.  But because the results are social benefits, they don’t generate cash which can be used to provide a return to investors.  So the government steps in to translate the social impact into a financial return for the investor.  It is this government promise to turn social impact into financial returns which unlocks the possible engagement of a much wider range of organisations in finance and delivery of social outcomes.

The concept is explained at more length in a publication by Social Finance, Towards a New Social Economy.   Social Finance’s role has been to get the contract put in place, and then attract capital into the fund. They are not themselves an investor in social impact bonds: their goal is to develop ways to enable finance to work better in social areas, both to raise more money and to allow it to be more effective. According to the FT:

If this is a revolution in social financing, it will not happen overnight. It will take three to four years for absolute proof the Peterborough project works, “but we believe there is the potential for hundreds of millions of pounds, even billions, of investment for social change through these sorts of structures,” Mr Eccles says.

Could something like this work in development?

One way this could work in development is as follows.

"I have a cunning plan"

A group of donors could make a binding commitment to pay a certain amount for particular outcomes, such as the number of  kids who complete school, or every household to get access to clean drinking water. (This is the kernel of the Cash on Delivery idea proposed by my colleagues at the Center for Global Development.)   Suppose you are a Minister in a developing country with a great plan for getting kids into school.  If the donors have promised to turn social results into financial returns, could you then persuade private investors – perhaps social investors or development finance institutions  - to front up the money to enable you to implement your plan?  (If not, might it be that you need a better plan?)

If your education scheme works, and the outcomes are achieved, donors hand over the money and investors get a financial return.  If your scheme doesn’t work, donors don’t hand over the aid, and your investors don’t get their money back.  Donor aid budgets are spent elsewhere.  You might have a little less luck raising money next time you have a cunning plan.

In general, a promise by donors to turn social returns (such as more kids vaccinated, reduced maternal mortality, more access to clean water) into a financial return might unlock a bigger range of sources of short-term financing for development. Possible financiers might include private sector institutional investors in search of commercial returns, social investors, high net worth individuals, foundations, development finance institutions (such as the World Bank and African Development Bank), or perhaps socially conscious individuals who want to put in a small amount of cash through an online service, with the expectation of just getting their money back, and nothing more, if the development results are achieved.   As well as (perhaps because of) the greater diversity of sources of finance, this might unlock more innovation and diversity in how those results can be achieved.

This could lead to a big change in the aid relationship and the role of aid agencies.  At the moment donors bundle together two potentially separate roles:

• providing finance for development;
• selecting among approaches for meeting development goals and supporting and monitoring their delivery.

The social impact bond approach would enable those two potentially distinct roles to be unbundled.  Donors could concentrate on identifying results for which they are willing to pay, putting a suitable price-tag on them, and ensuring that measurement of results is fair and accurate.

Once donors have made a commitment to turn social results into financial returns, developing countries could turn to a much wider range of organisations to help them design and deliver services, and a much bigger range of sources of short-term finance.  It would be up to the countries themselves to decide which social objectives to target, and how they wanted to go about doing it, subject to the discipline of being able to convince an investor (but not necessarily donors) that their plan makes sense. This approach would respect country ownership and prioritisation, and yet ensure that aid money was used only where it was really delivering results.

No substantial consideration has yet been given to whether and how social impact bonds might be used in the context of international development.    The closest analogy so far has been the International Finance Facility for Immunisation, but in that case there is no link between performance and the payout to investors.  In domestic policy, the Peterborough project to reduce re-offending is the only example so far of social impact bonds, though others are planned.

Those of us who are interested in international development should track the progress of these experiments and, if they are a success, think about how we might adapt the idea of social impact bonds to attract more diverse finance into development, as a way to improve the effectiveness with which aid money is used to reduce poverty.

Narrative 1: Glass half full: we need a big heave

The dominant story from the summit was that development can be achieved if the world would only come together with a big heave. On this view, the glass is half full. We have made good progress towards the MDGs (supported by the new MDG report card by ODI; and their excellent new Development Progress Stories website); and with more money, we can do more.  Jeff Sachs, whose Millennium Villages Project exemplifies the idea of a big, coordinated push, called in the FT for aid to be scaled up through pooled donor funding, “to scale up what has been proven to work”. (Oddly, he chose the Global Fund rather than the World Bank as his example of effective multilateral institution.)

The new report of the Commission for Africa advocates a further big heave

A new Commission for Africa report, Still Our Common Interest, agrees. The original 2005 report was probably the most authoritative (certainly the most weighty) argument for a big heave; and it concluded (among other things) that donors should treble their aid to Africa.  The updated 2010 report reiterates that view, celebrates the progress that has been made, and calls for donors to increase their aid, including – very oddly – a proposal for a new Global Fund for Education.

Probably the biggest announcement this week, which sits squarely in the big heave narrative, was for a new UN Global Strategy for Women and Children’s Health.  As I argued here the other day, the focus on women and children’s health is welcome, but this is no strategy: it is another list of spending commitments, which the UN press release says is worth $40 billion. The only interesting feature of it is that it lists commitments by private companies and NGOs as well as official donors.  All very big heave; all very retro.

Narrative 2: More accountability leads to better institutions

While the UN institutions and the NGOs promote the big heave, donor governments, particularly the US and UK, are beginning to tell a different story which focuses on the need for more transparent and accountable institutions, both in developing countries and in the international development system.  This was most evident in President Obama’s speech which announced a new US development strategy.   President Obama explicitly distanced himself from the big heave:

“This is the reality we must face — that if the international community just keeps doing the same things the same way, we may make some modest progress here and there, but we will miss many development goals.”

Both the US and the UK government argue that the efforts of donors should be measured not by what is spent, but by what is achieved, both by aid and by other policies.  Cynics might think this is preparing the ground for aid cuts in the face of tight government budgets, though this does not appear to be the motive of the UK government which has committed to increasing aid to 0.7% of GDP by 2013.

The emphasis in the new US policy on growth as the permanent path out of poverty is not as new as the President’s speech implies; but the renewed emphasis will be welcome to those who think that the importance of growth is sometimes forgotten. As Lant Pritchett writes:

The “development is about more than growth” backlash, which had important elements of truth, easily got carried away into “development isn’t at all about growth” and it is good to see economic growth back front and center of development objectives.

A more novel feature of the new US policy is the emphasis on investing in systems and institutions, for service delivery, public administration, and other government functions, and the importance of country ownership.  This is new for the US.  For many European donors it is this reasoning that brought them to give more of their aid through governments as budget support, so this new US approach will be seen as a welcome conversion.

What is striking about this narrative is the emphasis it puts on transparency and accountability as ways to make institutions work better.  President Obama set out the argument in his General Assembly speech the following day:

The arc of human progress has been shaped by individuals with the freedom to assemble and by organizations outside of government that insisted upon democratic change and by free media that held the powerful accountable.   … In all parts of the world, we see the promise of innovation to make government more open and accountable. Now, we must build on that progress. And when we gather back here next year, we should bring specific commitments to promote transparency; to fight corruption; to energize civic engagement; and to leverage new technologies so that we strengthen the foundation of freedom in our own countries, while living up to ideals that can light the world.

This emphasis on accountability seems to resonate closely with the approach of the UK Government.  The UK International Development Secretary, Andrew Mitchell, set out a similar argument in his first major speech, in which he emphasized outputs and outcomes rather than inputs, and launched the new UK Aid Transparency Guarantee.   Paul Collier and Jamie Drummond, writing in the Guardian, make a similar point about the need for transparency and accountability in the use of natural resources.

The 32 page outcome document, Keeping the Promise, sets out the usual long list of activities which “with increased political commitment .. could be replicated and scaled up for accelerating progress”.  But experienced communiqué watchers (like Lawrence Haddad) also detect a new theme: the need for more citizen-led monitoring of delivery.  For example, the outcome document calls on donors to:

[Work] towards greater transparency and accountability in international development cooperation, in both donor and developing countries, focusing on adequate and predictable financial resources as well as their improved quality and targeting; …. To build on progress achieved in ensuring that ODA is used effectively, we stress the importance of democratic governance, improved transparency and accountability, and managing for results.

Until now, I think many people working in the development community have seen transparency as an add-on, at best a way of retaining public support for aid while they get on with figuring out how to use the aid money wisely (and at worst an annoying additional bureaucratic burden).  Perhaps I am tempted to read too much into these speeches, because my day job is working towards more transparent and accountable institutions, but it was striking to see Raj Shah, Administrator of USAID, talking about the use of new media to build an online platform to help the government to reach its development goals.  I think it is now clear that, for the US and UK at least, transparency and accountability will play a more central role in their development strategies, both as drivers of change in developing countries, and forces for improvements in the effectiveness of development agencies and institutions.

A sign that this narrative is beginning to take shape is that it is already under attack.  In an interesting article in The New Republic, David Rieff is sceptical of the idea that donor nations can offer a path out of poverty:

The problem is not with the analysis but rather with the president’s implicit claim that we know how to offer peoples and nations such a path. … The stark fact is that only if one fetishizes the idea of civil society as a kind of universal ideological solvent, and believes that, in tandem with scientific innovation, the road to our collective salvation is now open to us, can such optimism be justified.

An interesting feature of this narrative is that it emphasizes the need for a wider range of instruments (known either as beyond aid or – ghastly term – policy coherence).  For example, in his speech, President Obama said:

Development is helping nations to actually develop — moving from poverty to prosperity.  And we need more than just aid to unleash that change.  We need to harness all the tools at our disposal — from our diplomacy to our trade policies to our investment policies.

Andrew Mitchell’s speech in June said something similar:

21st century development is a complex tapestry of trade, investment and enterprise, climate change, economic growth, debt relief, financial services, intellectual property and advancing new technologies.

Bill Easterly argued in the pages of the FT that trade, not aid, is needed to promote development. I’ve argued elsewhere that we don’t know very much about whether and how aid promotes economic and development, but we do know that it enables people to live better lives while that transformation is taking place.  So it may be that these beyond aid policies are the best hope for promoting development, while aid should focus primarily on improving lives in the meantime.

Narrative 3: The challenge is increasingly inequality, not absolute poverty

In my view, by far the most interesting and important paper to be published around the summit was The World’s Poor Aren’t Where We Think They Are, by Andy Sumner from IDS. Here’s the key conclusion:

In 1990, we estimate that 93 per cent of the world’s poor people lived in low income countries. In contrast, in 2007 we estimate that three-quarters of the world’s approximately 1.3bn poor people now live in middle-income countries (MICs) and only about a quarter of the world’s poor – about 370 million people live in the remaining 39 low-income countries, which are largely in sub-Saharan Africa.

The paper also shows that just 12 percent of the world’s poor live in fragile low-income countries.  Take a look at this Guardian data visualisation tool.

Data visualisation by the Guardian

This change in the reality on the ground has profound implications for development policy, and my sense is that the discussion in New York is not yet grappling with these issues.  Readers of Paul Collier’s book The Bottom Billion will recall his analysis that the world’s poorest people lived in about 50 very poor countries which he said were stuck in a series of poverty traps.  Policy should be focused on helping those countries to escape that trap. But if three quarters of the world’s poor live in middle income countries, the challenge is to reduce inequality in these countries.  The figures suggest that the biggest causes of poverty are not lack of development in the country as a whole, but political, economic and social marginalisation of particular groups in countries that are otherwise doing quite well.

It is not clear that additional resources from abroad are an important part of the answer to this. At The Guardian, Jonathan Glennie says:

The world needs to find new ways to help other countries respond to persistant poverty and increasing inequality. The era of aid as we know it is ending. Let’s hope that a new era of development cooperation takes its place.

For some people this suggests that we should reconceptualise development as the ability of all the world’s citizens to live decent lives, rather a problem of economic industrialisation of poor countries. This view has the advantage of focusing on people and communities, rather than countries.  A recurring theme of the Chronic Poverty conference, which took place just before the MDG Summit, was the right of all citizens to a basic standard of living, and there is growing interest in the possible role of various kinds of social protection (social safety-nets, conditional and unconditional cash transfers, family grants and so on).

Similarly, a new report from Phil Vernon and Deborrah Barksh at International Alert asks us to get “beyond the MDGs”.  They call for a

… a new narrative, based on a vision of a world in which people can resolve their differences without violence, while continuing to make equitable social and economic progress, and without lessening the opportunities for their neighbours or future generations to do the same. This vision would be both enabled and recognisable by five core factors: equal access to justice, political voice, security, economic opportunity and well-being. These would in their turn be underpinned by a self-reinforcing set of values and institutions.

On this view, poverty is a problem of political and economic marginalisation which can affect communities within industrialised, industrialising and low income countries.  It calls for a different kind of policy agenda, which is as much to do with empowerment and political voice as the transfer of resources and investment in public services.

Conclusion

These seem to be three quite different views of development.  There is a substantial gap between advocating a big heave of more aid to ignite a cycle of industrialisation in the poorest countries, a focus on more transparent and accountable institutions in developing countries and in the development system, and political change that protects the rights of society’s most marginalised groups in whatever country they happen to live.

But while there are tensions and trade-offs, these views are not intrinsically contradictory, and in a subsequent post I’ll look at how these three narratives can be stitched together into a coherent whole.

More details are on the aidinfo.org blog.  In short, the donors agreed

• Data will be published more quickly, with an agreement that information will be published as soon as possible, and at a minimum, quarterly. More timely information is a top ask of stakeholders in developing countries.
• Data will be published in a common, open format, so that it is readily accessible, comparable and easy to find.
• More detailed aid data will be published, increasing its relevance to users.

None of this is going to be easy for donors. It will require some investment in collecting better information and quality assurance, and it will require a significant change of culture as they move to the assumption that the details of all aid projects will be publicly available automatically.  But we know that the benefits hugely exceed these costs.  So kudos to the donors for taking this important first step on the road to comprehensive aid transparency.

Two particular highlights of the meetings from my point of view were:

• The five country pilots demonstrated the feasibility of automatic electronic data exchange between donors and developing country governments, and for the creation of data in standard IATI format; and
• The developing country representatives at the meeting were clear and vocal in their insistence that donors should publish details of how they are spending aid.

There is a long way to go, and there is a comprehensive work programme for phases 2 and 3 of IATI.  But last week donors took an extremely important first step for which they deserve credit.

Read more on the aidinfo blog.

First up, Roger Riddell says we need a radical rethink of foreign aid:

The gap between what it does and what it could do is widening fast. … The central problem of the aid system is that there is no system.  … Almost since official aid was first given, politicians have both warned of aid’s systemic problems and proposed alternatives. These include raising aid funds through an automatic compulsory mechanism based on the ability to pay; pooling aid resources and allocating them on the basis of need; and, if there are grounds for believing that the recipient government is unable or unwilling to use the aid funds transparently, “ring-fencing” the aid in a fund to be administered independently.

Most of these good ideas have been eclipsed by the focus on increasing aid levels. A common response to anyone advocating these solutions to aid’s systemic problems is the counter-argument that they are part of the very nature of the aid system, and that it is naive to suggest that it can be changed. They warn that if governments are unable to decide for themselves how to give aid and then check on its use, then they simply won’t provide it.

There are two ways to respond to these arguments. One is to point out that that aid’s systemic problems are getting worse and fast and frustrating progress on the core objective of ending extreme poverty. Resolving key systemic problems would probably have a greater effect on extreme poverty than expanding the amount of aid given. The other is to draw attention to high-level discussions where the sorts of changes needed to fix aid are being presented as politically viable.

The authors of Philanthrocapitalism, Mike Green and Matt Bishop, also think that the aid system needs reform, but they have a very different view of the direction of travel:

Like it or not, we have to find new ways of making the aid money go further and find new ways of financing development that do not depend on the political will of a few rich countries. Philanthrocapitalism, by tapping the expertise, creativity, money and other resources of the private sector, has to be central to a new development strategy. First, to pilot and test ideas to make aid smarter and more effective. Second, to leverage more private capital – full for-profit, ethical investment and donations – to fill the gap.

As we have argued before, this means thinking about aid not as the exclusive preserve of government but as a partnership with philanthrocapitalists, rich and less rich alike. This challenge is urgent and the rich countries are being slow to take it up - Britain’s new government, in particular, seems set on business as usual (although there are plenty of disgruntled voices on the right who would like to see an axe taken to the aid budget).

Both arguments start from the view that the challenges to aid are the result of political pressures in donor countries.  Roger Riddell argues for a more centralised, technocratic aid system which can be isolated from undue political influences.  Mike and Matt want to see much greater involvement from a range of other actors, especially the big philanthropic foundations.

I think they are both partly right, and both partly wrong.

Roger Riddell is right to say that the systemic problems of aid are the result of politics; and he is right to disagree with the pessimistic idea that these problems are insurmountable.  But he wants to address these problems but putting the aid system at arm’s length.  I don’t think this is a viable solution: it wishes the problem away.  It is like saying that we can solve the global climate change problem by handing over control of energy policy to an international panel of wise people.  The politics matters, and we can’t make them go away by asking technicians to give us the answer; so we have to figure out how to change the politics.

The aid system today is characterised by aid institutions (official aid agencies, international organisations and charities) trying to mediate between the preferences of the people who give them money and their view of the interests of people in developing countries.  Aid agency staff typically want to do as much as they can for people in developing countries: if you ask most aid agency staff who their “client” is, they will tell you it is the world’s poor, not their own taxpayer. But they feel they can’t do many of the things they would like to do (such as improve the allocation of aid, reduce conditionality, make long-term commitments, scale back paperwork and process, focus more sharply, untie aid etc) because they have to take account of the preferences of the people whose money they are spending.  They see themselves as a firewall, serving the interests of the poor by protecting the aid programme as best they can from what they consider ill-informed or selfish wishes of their taxpayers. This behaviour is not confined to official donor agencies: many NGOs say one thing to their supporters, and do something quite different (think, for example, of the difference between what Kiva actually does and what most people think that it does).   In my view, trying to deliver effective aid despite public opinion  is fundamentally misconceived and unsustainable; this model is beginning to fray at the edges, and could well fall apart.

The alternative approach is for aid agencies to recognize that the public wants to see aid used as effectively as possible; and to build an informed conversation about how that can be achieved.  The stakeholders see the issues from different perspectives: for example, the public sees the benefits of spreading its aid across many countries and sectors, while aid agency staff see the ineffective duplication this creates.  The solution to this is to share information and build a common view, not to try to disempower the public.  If the aid bureaucracies believe that long-term commitments of aid to strengthen national systems is more effective in the long run than the series of smaller ad hoc projects that the public seems to prefer, then they should  produce the analysis and evidence and persuade their stakeholders.   Both Roger and I believe that more aid should be given to the poorest countries; he believes that this decision should be taken out of the political process, while I believe we have to win the public round by explaining why that would be better.

In the long run, public opinion will determine how much aid is given, to whom, and by what means: we cannot and should not try to sidestep the argument by putting the administration of aid beyond the reach of public opinion.  The only sustainable way to make aid more effective is to change the political pressures by producing persuasive evidence and analysis.   If Roger’s approach is to insulate aid from political pressure, my approach would be work to align those political pressures with more effective aid by making aid more transparent and accountable.

By contrast, Mike Green and Matt Bishop want to improve aid, and attract more resources, by making more use of the expertise and money of the private sector.  I agree with them that there is huge potential for the growing diversity in the aid system to improve the effectiveness of development system, if different organisations focus on the contributions that they can make.  Foundations could act like venture capitalists: taking bigger risks but leaving long-term financing of scaled up successes to official aid donors. Private aid could focus on achieving community and individual level results. Specialised global organizations could provide particular expertise not available through generalist support. The diversity of official donors could provide innovation rather than a monoculture of ideas. Official aid agencies could focus on long term funding and resource transfer, and support for institutional change.

Unfortunately it is not clear that all these different actors really are focusing on their strengths, and there is nothing in the aid system that pushes them to do so.  The foundations do not display the higher risk appetite that we would expect them to have (despite their rhetoric).  The approach of official aid agencies to the division of labour does not appear to be intended to drive specialisation (from which the benefit of division of labour derives) but simply to limit spread.   Diversity of approaches and innovation are essential, but this must be accompanied by mechanisms which kill off bad innovations and take good ideas to scale; otherwise the effect is simply to add to costs and fragment systems.

In their book, Philanthrocapitalism, Mike Green and Matt Bishop give several examples in which philanthropic foundations have made significant and worthwhile contributions. The role of the Rockefeller Foundation in promoting the Green Revolution is a compelling example.  But from these successes they extrapolate a wildly rose-tinted view of the work of foundations.  As with official aid, there are successes and failures; there are good practices and bad.

My impression is that, at their worst, foundations are much less effective, and behave even worse than official donors.  For example, I have seen:

• massive unpredictability and volatility of foundation grants; many foundations make grants worth 5% of their capital asset value each year, which is the minimum imposed on them by US tax authorities.   In years when asset prices are volatile, many foundations pass on this volatility to grantees – they do not (as they could, if they chose) use their capital to smooth out the grant-giving and make it more predictable and stable.  In 2009 I know of some foundations which imposed in-year cuts exceeding 25% on their grantees, leading to cuts in services and imposing huge costs in developing countries just at the time when the world economic crisis created needs for additional funding;
• reinventing the wheel and failure to learn – it is one of the advantages of foundations that they can be innovative and unconventional; unfortunately, both the benefactors and staff of many foundations suffer from an inflated sense of their own abilities, and foundations often repeat basic mistakes that have been made for many years, rather than building on the experience and wisdom of organisations that have made these mistakes before;
• capriciousness and personality-driven priorities – both the staff and benefactors of foundations get ideas into their heads from which they cannot be dissuaded.  There are many examples of ludicrous decisions and instructions from foundation staff to grantees based on nothing more than their prejudices or personal preferences.

Of course, official aid agencies also suffer from these problems to some extent.  But they also benefit from a degree of public accountability which puts them under pressure to be more effective.  I think Matt Bishop and Mike Green underestimate the problems that foundations suffer as a result of their lack of accountability.  In many cases benefactors became rich in markets; and they often trusted their instincts. But when they got a judgement wrong they were soon punished by the market, and they were able to change course.  Now that they are philanthropists, they do not have any such feedback.  When they make the wrong decision, everyone is too afraid to tell them, for fear of losing the opportunity to apply for the next grant.  There is no mechanism for identifying and rewarding their most effective staff; nothing that forces foundations to concentrate on what they are really good at.

In many ways we have the worst of all worlds: with some notable exceptions, foundations do not in practice take enough advantage of the opportunities that their lack of accountability give them (for example, taking bigger risks, or supporting unpopular causes) but they do suffer from the weaknesses that lack of accountability imposes on them.

So I think Mike and Matt are right to say that development relationships should not be the exclusive preserve of government, and that is should increasingly be an effective partnership with philanthrocapitalists, NGOs, private sector organisations and individuals.  But without some more effective governance arrangements in the aid system, we will not reap the potential benefits of this partnership.  We need stronger pressures for the different partners to make their specific contributions effectively, which in turn demands greater transparency and stronger accountability for all organisations.

Both articles start from the premise that the aid system needs to be improved; on this I think we all agree.  But Roger’s solution – putting aid beyond politics – is unlikely to be effective, and is undemocratic.  If we believe that politics constrains effective aid decisions, we should square up to trying to change the politics, not trying to insulate ourselves from it.  And Mike and Matt’s answer – passing the baton to very rich Americans – is no answer either.  These stakeholders certainly have a contribution to make, but to be effective their contribution must be part of a system that is likely to get the best from all partners working together, and holds everyone to account; otherwise we risk having all the disadvantages of the free market with none of the benefits of market discipline.

Disclosure: the organisation for which I work receives grants from the Gates Foundation and Hewlett Foundation.

But Bill Easterly’s post got me thinking. One great thing about the iPad (and the iPhone, etc) is the way it works as a platform for apps.

It is easy to write an app for the iPad or iPhone.  The platform takes care of the complicated stuff – accessing the internet, accepting user input, drawing on the screen – leaving the application developer to focus on the specific functions of the application itself.

Wouldn’t it be good to have a common “platform” in development, on which specific “applications” could be run?   The back office stuff – accounting, auditing, public financial management, rigorous evaluation, human resource management, management of building and vehicles and other resources, information technology, knowledge management and sharing – could all be provided centrally, avoiding duplication and costs.  Specific aid programmes could be run as “apps” on that platform.

We are a long way from that now.  There are 9 separate Oxfams running projects in Ethiopia.  Four of them have offices in Addis Ababa (GB, US, Canada, Spain) and another five run projects in Ethiopia out of offices in other countries.  That’s just Oxfam.  Save the Children has – I think – seven offices in Ethiopia.  That’s before you start with the official donors, each with their own infrastructure, and galaxy of expat staff, offices, drivers, accountants, press officers, and gardeners.  There is no reason for all those functions to be duplicated everywhere.

Aid agencies are on a journey from being primarily administrative organisations – specialists in project management – into knowledge-based organisations.   They should be purveyors of ideas, analysis, evidence and influence, within developing countries, international institutions, and industrialised countries.  To do this, they need to focus more of their resources and management capacity on their core business.  One way to do this would be for them to cut those administrative costs by using a common, shared platform. They can then focus on the apps that go on top.

A shared development platform would reduce costs and waste, and increase the scope for innovation, flexibility and diversity, and it would enable aid agencies to focus on their real value added.  So will it happen? I doubt it.

Rich countries have many reasons for wanting to help poor countries. The main three British political parties speak in their manifestos of Britain’s obligations to the developing world (Lib Dems); moral duty, common interest and poverty emergency (Lab); and enlightened self interest and commitment (Cons).  The combination of motives – moral concern for others and self-interest – is a strength of the development cause, not a handicap.

These motives translate into two broad classes of objectives for development policy:

• One view is that development assistance should help to accelerate economic and institutional change in developing countries. The idea is that temporary support from outside can be a catalyst for permanent changes in developing countries. As economic growth takes off, developing countries will no longer need our help.  This view is attractive both to donors, who do not want to go on giving aid for ever, and for recipient countries who do not want to continue to be aid dependent.  For shorthand we will call this the transformation objective of development assistance.
• Another view is that development assistance can improve people’s lives today. This is most obvious in the case of humanitarian relief, for which the objective is to provide food and shelter; but more generally a lot of aid is used to send children to school or provide basic health care.  On this view, the development process is long and hard, and one role for outsiders is to enable people to live better lives while this process is happening in their country. Let’s call this the solidarity objective of development assistance.

It is entirely reasonable for countries, organizations and individuals to care deeply about both the transformation and the solidarity objective, and they can coherently pursue both objectives at the same time.

From time to time, people try to make connections between these objectives, positive and negative.

The claim of a positive connection is the idea that spending money on health and education is an investment in the human capital of a country, and that this will, in time, lead to faster economic growth.  Some point to significant investments in education in fast-growing Asian economies as evidence that education spending will promote growth.  Others say that improving health will lead to a demographic transition, in which falling infant mortality leads to smaller family sizes and greater investment in each child.  Both of these stories are appealing, though unfortunately neither is very well supported by the evidence.

The possibility of a negative connection is that the things that donors do to support people in developing countries as a matter of solidarity may actually slow down the political, social, institutional and economic changes that the country needs for transformation.  It may sustain unaccountable governments in power; undermine the social contract between citizen and state; hollow out fragile government institutions; cause appreciation of the real exchange rate and so choke off exports; or create a culture of dependency that dims demand for social change.  Again, the empirical evidence for these (quite plausible) ideas is pretty thin (pace the claims of Dambisa Moyo).

Are we using the right tools to pursue our two types of objective: tying to catalyze transformation, and at the same time to help people live better lives?   I think we are focusing too much on aid and not enough on development policies.

It is quite straightforward to see that aid can help meet solidarity objectives.  It is used to provide clean water and food, and to finance public services such as health and education.  There is quite good evidence that it is effective, though there is much more to learn about how to do it better.

It is much less clear that aid achieves our transformation objectives. The statistical evidence linking aid to economic growth is, at best, uncertain (see The Anarchy of Numbers by David Roodman).  This does not mean that there is no relationship – it is much harder to demonstrate a statistical connection when there are few countries to observe, and so many factors as well as aid that are likely to affect whether a country achieves economic lift-off.  We can think of aid being to growth what venture capital is to start-ups: many investments will fail, but the huge benefits from the few that succeed may make the losses worthwhile.

I personally have my doubts that aid makes much difference to the prospects for economic and social transformation.  Countries change from within, through long, slow, organic processes, and it is hard to see how money and advice from outside can make much of a difference to that.  Consider our own history, and the decades and centuries that it has taken us so far to construct our social and political institutions.

If we are serious about promoting transformation, we need to look beyond aid to how we can change the environment in which developing countries are struggling to change their economic, social and political institutions. Transformation is much likely to take root if we create conditions in which it is likely to succeed.

What are the development policies that might contribute to this?

1. Trade policy – As well as duty-free, quote-free access for all developing countries to our markets, we have to dismantle the complex rules – such as rules of origin and phyto-sanitary standards – which make exports complicated.
2. Agriculture policy – We have to stop dumping subsidized agricultural over production abroad, especially as our aid conditions prevent developing countries from competing with us. We also have to stop using food aid as a welfare system for European and American farmers.
3. Climate change – If anthropogenic global warming is a reality, as is the consensus among scientists, then the harm we are doing to developing countries through climate change will become one of the most important obstacles to development.  Probably the most important thing we can do to accelerate development is to stop our own carbon emissions.
4. Conflict – We make and sell the guns that are used in conflicts in developing countries.  We buy the oil and minerals over which groups are fighting.  We sustain the unaccountable leaders in pursuit of our geo-strategic interests.   If we were serious about development, we would by now have stopped the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda – it would be a simple matter for a well-resourced army.
5. Immigration – In the 18^th Century, a third of Europeans moved to America, to the benefit of both continents.  In the 20^th and 21^st century we have introduced historically unprecedented restrictions on the movement of people – notwithstanding our rhetoric about globalization. These restrictions may be the single most important factor which explains why poor countries have not been able to converge on rich countries.
6. Intellectual property – Another constraint on the ability of developing countries to close the gap is that there are historically unprecedented constraints on their ability to appropriate technologies. For centuries, new agricultural techniques such as crop rotation spread through word of mouth.  During the industrial revolution, America and Europe were able to use technologies from Britain.  When Henry Ford invented the assembly line, the idea was rapidly adopted everywhere.  But today’s technologies – from business software to pharmaceuticals and biotechnology – are protected by patents that make it impossible for other countries to adopt.
7. Corruption – We often think of corruption as a problem of developing countries, but this ignores the fact that the money for corruption comes from, and often returns to, industrialised countries.  Rich western companies pay bribes, in return for access to contracts or minerals.  To his eternal credit, President Jimmy Carter introduced the Foreign Corrupt Practises Act, which made it harder for American companies to pay bribes abroad. But there is much more we could do, if we were prepared to take on the vested interests of our own multinational companies, to reduce corruption in developing countries.
8. International governance – In our own nations, we have long ago dropped the property qualification for representation; but internationally we do not think that it is strange that representation in our main institutions is based on wealth and power.  This matters because again and again, the interests of developing nations are ignored, or treated only as a footnote.  From banking secrecy to internet peering arrangement, the rules of the game are set by the wealthy in their own interests. Changes to these practices which would be irrelevant to most of us, but could make a huge difference to the prospects for development, are resisted by powerful vested interests from industrialized countries.

It is entirely reasonable that industrialized countries want both to promote transformation in developing countries, and to help people there to live better lives while that process is taking place.  Aid has been proven to be an effective instrument for meeting our solidarity objective, but it is far less clear that it is a significant driver of transformative change.  Our political rhetoric focuses on the idea that development policies should promote transformation.  Yet it seems unlikely that aid is the most useful tool we have for achieving this.  If we are serious about transformation we should invest  more time and effort in creating the global environment in which economic and social change are more likely to succeed, by changing our policies and behaviours on issues like trade, agricultural policies and immigration.

Many people who work in development are directly or indirectly dependent on aid. Government development agencies gain their bureaucratic position from the size of their budget.  International NGOs get a lot of their money from aid budgets or from private charitable giving.  Partly as a result, the debate about development too often shifts to aid: whether it works, how much is given and by what means.  These are important questions, but primarily for the important goal of helping people in developing countries to live better lives while they are waiting for, and helping to build, a more prosperous and fair society.  If we are serious about accelerating the transformation, it is our development policies, not aid policy, that we should be discussing.

Not only has the World Bank made this data available, it has created interfaces that enable programmers to access the data automatically (in technical language, they are providing an API).  That in turn means that individuals and organisations can create programmes, websites or visualizations that use the data and enable them to mash it up with other information.

This data does not yet included detailed World Bank project data.  But the World Bank is part of the International Aid Transparency Initiative, IATI, through which 18 donors are working together to put detailed aid data online.  When that is up and running, it will be possible to access aid data in the same way as the development information being put online by the World Bank today.

This is a huge step forward for open access to development data.  Well done the World Bank.

Even if the quantitative analysis is correct (which is by no means certain, given huge gaps in information), it is far from clear that this is a problem that needs to be solved. Furthermore, of the five recommendations in the paper, three are irresponsible sectoral special pleading which deserve to be rapidly dismissed.

This story has spilled over into the mainstream press (for example, in The New York Times) as a result of a sensationalist AP story headed “Health Aid Made Some Countries Cut Budgets“. The story breathlessly reveals:

After getting millions of dollars to fight AIDS, some African countries responded by slashing their health budgets, new research says. For years, the international community has forked over billions in health aid, believing the donations supplemented health budgets in poor countries. It now turns out development money prompted some governments to spend on entirely different things.  … “When an aid official thinks he is helping a low-income African patient avoid charges at a health clinic, in reality, he is paying for a shopping trip to Paris for a government minister and his wife,” said Philip Stevens, of the London-based think tank International Policy Network.

The language used by the authors is less inflammatory, but the opening sentence makes it clear they think there is a problem:

Government spending on health from domestic sources is an important indicator of a government’s commitment to the health of its people, and is essential for the sustainability of health programmes.

As summarized in their press release, the authors make five recommendations to deal with this alleged problem:

• adoption of a clear set of reporting standards for government health spending as source and spending in other health-related sectors
• establishment of collaborative targets to maintain or increase the share of government expenditures going to health
• investment in developing countries’ capacity to effectively receive and spend health aid
• careful assessment of the risks and benefits of expanded health aid to non-governmental sectors
• study of the use of global price subsidies or product transfers as mechanisms for health aid

The first recommendation is fine: I’m all for the adoption of reporting standards for spending by donors and by governments, and for those standards to specify the source as well as the destination of all spending. (The authors may not be aware of the progress that is being made globally on this under the International Aid Transparency Initiative).   It is also hard to be against investing in the capacity of developing countries to receive and spend health aid, though I wonder what this means in practice.  The other three recommendations are irresponsible, for reasons we shall come to below.

Let’s start with the problem we are trying to solve.  It is far from clear that the behaviour of developing countries described in the paper is anything we should be concerned about.  Of course health advocates who earn their living from health spending in developing countries are up in arms at the news that their various wheezes to capture a big chunk of available development finance and redirect it to their cause may not have been a complete success.   But those of us who take a more objective view of the relative priorities of different types of development spending can be more sanguine.

There are at least four reasons why the findings of the paper should not be a cause for concern.

First, it suggests that governments are reprioritising their spending in the light of the aid they are receiving. I think this is a good thing.    Exercises to find out what poor people actually care about, such as Voices of the Poor, routinely find that the poor place put a lot of value on security (of person and property), but this does not usually excite people who work in development.  Donors find it more attractive to finance health services than to pay for essential services such as a national statistical office or the efficient functioning of courts.  If we are willing to pick up the bill for health care then it is not only reasonable but desirable that developing countries should use the fiscal space we have created to invest more in important national priorities that don’t happen to be of interest to their donors.

Second, increases in aid for health may well come at the expense of other forms of aid which developing countries are right to try to offset.  (I say “may well” because of course we don’t know what would have happened to total aid if health aid had not increased so rapidly.)  Donor fads come and go: this year it is agriculture.  When developing countries see health aid rising, but the donors losing interest in infrastructure, the most sensible thing they can do is make an offsetting shift in their own budget allocations.  When the donor pendulum swings back again, recipient countries will have to make the corresponding shift in the opposite direction.

Third, as eloquently pointed out by Sridhar and Woods in the Lancet, the desire to force changes in the spending priorities of recipient countries runs directly contrary to the evidence about what makes aid effective, and a series of international agreements, especially the Paris Declaration (2005) and Accra Agenda for Action (2008). In the face of evidence that aid is most effective when there is ownership by the recipient country, donors and multilateral agencies committed themselves to align their aid with the systems and priorities of recipient countries.  It is not OK for health sector lobbyists to ignore this because they don’t like the priorities actually chosen by developing countries.

Fourth and finally, we say that we want to see capable, accountable and responsive states in developing countries.  Making, passing and executing budgets is the very heart of a capable and accountable state. That is why in the UK, as in many other western-style democracies, a government which cannot pass its budget (“carry supply”) is deemed to be unable to govern.  If resource allocation priorities are determined elsewhere, then the government is one in name only.  We cannot expect governments to be accountable to their citizens for decisions that they have not made.  If we want accountable states rather than puppet client states, we should rejoice, not complain, when they demonstrate a willingness to make choices of their own.

Sectoral advocates may say that we should not accept the priorities determined by developing countries, especially in countries in which there are weaknesses in democratic accountability or technical ability to execute budgets.   They might say that the government represents the interests of an elite, not the majority of the country’s poor.  Of course that may be true in some countries: but there is no reason to think that donors’ priorities, also driven by vocal lobby groups and vested interests, reflect the real needs of a country or its poorest people.  We should avoid getting into the situation in which well-heeled foreign academics and lobbyists from international NGOs with no accountability to people in developing countries are treated as a more representative voice of the poor than their own government.

What is most shocking about this paper is that it betrays a combination of ignorance of, or indifference to, decades of experience about what works in development.  The three most egregiously inappropriate recommendations amount to setting input targets, bypassing government by using NGOs, and giving aid in kind rather than in cash.  The paper’s authors should pause to reflect on the fact that progressive development thinking has fought a long, slow, painful campaign to shift away from exactly this kind of aid, and for very good reasons.  Aid that leads to long-term, sustainable change must be based on real ownership of the developing country and help build rather than undermine or marginalise national institutions.

To be fair to the authors, the press release is quite measured, and it begins by highlighting the commitment to health by developing country governments.  It also highlights the most important and sensible of their recommendations, the need for greater transparency.   But the paper also irresponsibly creates the impression, amplified by the Associated Press, that health aid has somehow been wasted, and that donors should try to address this in ways that would be a couple of steps backwards on the long slow road to more effective aid.

Complex societies collapse because, when some stress comes, those societies have become too inflexible to respond. In retrospect, this can seem mystifying. Why didn’t these societies just re-tool in less complex ways? The answer Tainter gives is the simplest one: When societies fail to respond to reduced circumstances through orderly downsizing, it isn’t because they don’t want to, it’s because they can’t.  In such systems, there is no way to make things a little bit simpler – the whole edifice becomes a huge, interlocking system not readily amenable to change. … Furthermore, even when moderate adjustments could be made, they tend to be resisted, because any simplification discomfits elites.

There is obvious and direct relevance to the development system (thanks to @ryanbriggs for making this connection).

The problem starts, according to Tainter, because society’s elite members keep adding new layers of decision-making and complexity:

a group of people, through a combination of social organization and environmental luck, finds itself with a surplus of resources. Managing this surplus makes society more complex—agriculture rewards mathematical skill, granaries require new forms of construction, and so on.  Early on, the marginal value of this complexity is positive—each additional bit of complexity more than pays for itself in improved output—but over time, the law of diminishing returns reduces the marginal value, until it disappears completely. At this point, any additional complexity is pure cost.

This is an almost perfect description of the aid system as experienced on the ground by developing countries.  (I have often wondered if the common empirical finding of diminishing returns to aid is in fact the result of diminishing returns to the number of donors.)  We have more and more donor agencies (the UN has more agencies working in developing countries than there are developing countries).  The burgeoning number of donors impose more contradictory conditions, add transactions costs, drive up the price of scarce resources, and coordination costs grow exponentially.

The Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action are an attempt by the donors to take marginal steps towards simplification in the face of a changing world.   Will this work?   I doubt it, for the reasons set out in my paper Beyond Planning: Markets and Networks for Better Aid.  Here is Clay Shirky’s summary of why marginal steps towards simplification usually fail:

There is, however, one element of complex society into which neither markets nor democracy reach—bureaucracy.  Bureaucracies temporarily reverse the Second Law of Thermodynamics. In a bureaucracy, it’s easier to make a process more complex than to make it simpler, and easier to create a new burden than kill an old one.

A few weeks ago, the country heads in Ethiopia of the European aid agencies met to discuss how they could simplify their work.  It was triggered by a letter of 4th February 2010 from Stefano Manservisi, the Director General for Development in the EU, to the heads of European aid agencies  calling for them to agree a “division of labour” in Ethiopia.  Of course, the meeting was an expensive flop: each donor showed up fully briefed to explain why it is essential that they continue to be involved in every sector.* Rather than streamlining their operations, donors have begun to discuss new layers of complexity, such as the designation of “lead” donors, “focal points” and “silent partners”, so that they can continue to operate as now but under the pretence of greater specialisation.  This was entirely predictable: the bureaucratic and political need to be involved in many sectors in every country is a far more powerful force than the intangible development benefits of simplification.

Where there is a clear need for more simplicity – such as in the delivery of health aid – the system is unable to merge or close institutions, to reduce the number of donors and simplify the way aid is delivered. Instead our response to complexity is to add yet more layers and institutions, such as the International Health Partnership.  Apparently none of the participants sees the irony of creating a new global partnership to tackle the problems caused by the existence of too many global health initiatives. As Tainter predicted: it is easier to make a process more complex than to make it simpler.

Senegal has 82 individual aid co-ordination forums.

Here is another example.  The rise of global health funds led to a collapse in the funding for health systems of developing countries.  Instead of giving money to countries to enable them to build up their network of primary health clinics and to train health workers, money was channeled to the Global Fund and GAVI to buy medicines and bednets.  PEPFAR would pay for brand new laboratories for AIDS, complete with lab technicians and doctors, while the next-door health centre could afford neither staff nor medicines.   The results was a worsening of health care.  How did the aid system respond?  Not by reducing the money flowing to global funds and putting the money back into government health systems using the existing channel of the World Bank: in the meantime the global funds had become too powerful and the bureaucratic capture was too great for that kind of simplification.  So instead these agencies have created a Health Systems Funding Platform, the purpose of which is to “… harmonize and eventually provide support through a joint system funding platform”.  These agencies are now involved in a series of conferences and meetings to figure out to harmonize their work on health systems.  It is obvious to everyone is that neither GAVI nor the Global Fund should be involved in this at all, but there is no way to get them out, or to shift their funding elsewhere, now that they exist.

In 2008 and 2009 I took part in an OECD DAC “Strategic Reflection Exercise” to consider “how to sustain and increase the relevance of the DAC and its subsidiary bodies in the changing development co-operation landscape”. Given the changing relationship between donors and recipient countries, the rise of new donors outside the DAC such as China and the Gates Foundation, the proliferation of global funds, and challenges to the aid model, this would have been a terrific opportunity to chart a new course for the aid system.   I argued that the DAC would remain relevant only if it underwent radical change, including expanding to include a much more diverse range of donors, becoming a partnership of donors and developing countries (and not merely a donor club), and taking on a stronger regulatory function with real teeth rather than just a talking shop with an ace statistical unit attached.  Of course, the bureaucrats from the incumbent aid agencies were not willing to contemplate any of this.  The resulting report consigns the DAC to oblivion in a changing world.

There are signs of coming collapse all around us.  The complexity of the system is accelerating, despite the good intentions of the Paris and Accra declarations, as the system struggles to cope with change.  Here is a graph showing the number of individual aid projects recorded in the AidData database:

Support for the aid system is beginning to haemorrhage;  Dambisa Moyo’s book, Dead Aid, though it is poorly researched and deliberately misleading, has captured a public mood.  More credible voices, like that of Andrew Mwenda, are speaking out against the aid system.   Donors see China’s rise as an aid donor in Africa as a threat, and huddle together to wonder how they can bring China into their system. (Of course, neither China nor the Gates Foundation is remotely interested in joining the system that donors have built for themselves).

So we may be on the brink of a collapse of the entire “business model”, as traumatic as the closure of newspapers in the United States (the UK is a year or so behind).   Perhaps we should see this as an opportunity, rather than a threat.  Collapse may be the appropriate response, an opportunity to build a new system from the bottom up.  As Clay Shirky observes, rather than trying to rescue the old system, we may be better off looking for new ways to achieve our goals:

When ecosystems change and inflexible institutions collapse, their members disperse, abandoning old beliefs, trying new things, making their living in different ways than they used to. It’s easy to see the ways in which collapse to simplicity wrecks the glories of old. But there is one compensating advantage for the people who escape the old system: when the ecosystem stops rewarding complexity, it is the people who figure out how to work simply in the present, rather than the people who mastered the complexities of the past, who get to say what happens in the future.

* In case you are wondering, it was not somebody from DFID who told me about this.

Almost every successful complex system became successful through a process of evolution.

Complex animals are the result of generations of evolution: of random mutation of genes (variation) and then survival of the fittest (selection).  That is how complex animals, superbly adapted to their environment, come into existence.   In market economies firms and products are launched  (variation). If customers like their products, and if the firms are efficient, they will grow; if not the firm will fail (selection). That is why well-functioning markets tend to have efficient firms which make products that customers  want.  Political movements spring up (variation) and do well if they are popular with the electorate (selection).

At the end of The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins invented the notion of a meme, an idea which tends to reproduce itself in a community such as a fashion, culture, value, melody or belief.  He describes how societies with successful memes (“Don’t marry your cousin”) tend to do better than societies with memes that do them harm (“Humans make a tasty dinner”).

The development system is a complex system, but it would be excessively kind to claim that it is a successful one.  There are many initiatives to design a new “aid architecture”  which are unlikely to succeed; and even if they did, do we really want to wait another half a century until we can agree the next new design?  What we need instead is to instill into the development system mechanisms that force it to evolve as circumstances change.

In development, we have quite a lot of variation but not enough selection.

There are too many, rather than too few, organisations and projects in development.  Here in Ethiopia, nine sectors have 20 donors or more (including health, governance, education, water, agriculture, infrastructure), and according to the DAC database there were 1 840 projects by aid donors in Ethiopia in 2007.  Globally the UN has more agencies working in development than there are developing countries, and there are more than a hundred global funds working in the health sector alone.

It isn’t just DAC donors and multilaterals that are proliferating.  In Ethiopia there are more than 3 500 NGOs, almost entirely funded from overseas. As with official aid agencies, some of these NGOs are outstanding.  Some are well-meaning but ineffective.  Some are charlatans and rent-seekers.  Ethiopians are shrewd judges of which are which.  But the ineffective agencies and NGOs and the charlatans, and some very duff projects, still get funded year after year.

I recently met a European bureaucrat sent to “build capacity” at the Africa Union, whose headquarters are here in Addis Ababa.   As we ran together in the hills above Addis where Ethiopian athletes train, he told me frankly that his project was a complete waste of time. No surprise: we have known the shortcomings of the way donors give “technical assistance” for more than forty years.  But there is nothing in the aid system that forces organisations to stop wasting money on projects that everybody knows will never work.

A slight disagreement with Bill Easterly

This is where I partly disagree with my friend and fellow blogger, Bill Easterly (or to be more accurate, I disagree with the following caricature of his view).  Bill argues in The White Man’s Burden that there are too many “planners” and not enough “searchers” in development.  He is robustly critical of anyone with anything resembling a grand plan, and consistently sceptical of the aid industry’s habit of herding towards the next big thing (microfinance, agriculture, etc).  He calls for more experimentation, and more small scale programmes grounded in local realities.

I’m all for lots of experimentation: an evolutionary process needs variation. But the evolutionary force missing in the aid system is not variation but selection.    For the evolutionary process to work, there has to be some process by which more resources are channelled to effective aid, and resources are taken away from things that don’t work.  If not a planner, then there has to be some sort of decision maker to make this happen.  Bill seems to agree with this in principle -  the AidWatchers prize for Best In Aid went to the “smart giving” movement which encourages private donors to give more money to effective organisations.  But if ever someone suggests that a particular approach appears to be work and ought to be scaled up, Bill pops up and accuses them of being a planner, or of diverting scarce resources to their pet cause at the expense of the myriad of other grass roots programmes being promoted by searchers.

While I agree with Bill’s robust scepticism, and his demand for more rigorous evidence, I think he focuses too much on the need for more “searchers” and does not sufficiently focus on the need for stronger selective pressures. I agree that we don’t want a plan, but we do need some way of doing more of what works, and doing less of what does not, and that in turn requires some sort of institutions to channel aid to priorities.  But Bill is apparently allergic to any sort of institution playing this role.

What would better selection look like?

There is a  movement which advocates a suite of sensible measures, including:

• a stronger focus on results, and less focus on announcements of spending
• more rigorous and independent evaluation, using randomised controlled trials where possible
• a stronger link between funding and results (for example, Cash on Delivery aid, EU MDG Contracts and the selectivity of the Millennium Challenge Corporation)
• promoting better giving to charities by the public (through  organizations like GiveWell, Philanthropedia and Great Nonprofits)

I’m in favour of all these things, and I would like to see more of them.  But they are all essentially “top down” mechanisms for selection, in which the pressure comes from wise outsiders who decide what is working.

Other complex systems do not rely on top down intervention to force selection (unless perhaps you believe in theistic evolution, in which change occurs through the external intervention of a benign deity.)  Tesco is not the largest supermarket in the UK because the government has conducted thorough monitoring and evaluation of its outputs and outcomes.   We do not used randomised controlled trials to decide which coffee shops should stay open.   Political parties win elections by getting votes, not because they have convinced a higher authority of the quality of their log-frames.

We should not exaggerate the market metaphor: development work is not exactly like a market, and anyway few markets operate well without some kind of central regulation.  But it isn’t neoliberal faith in markets to say we should look for more bottom-up ways to enhance selective pressure in development, so that the decisions are not made by benign deities from outside (even ones who know who to do randomised trials) but by the people who are supposed to benefit from the aid.

In a recent TED talk David Cameron spoke of a post bureaucratic age in government, in which citizens are able to improve services through greater local accountability.   More use of top down evaluation, with consultants flying in to conduct rigorous baseline surveys and measure results of treatment and control groups, however rigorous and independent, does not feel very ‘post bureaucratic’ to me.

There are increasingly many examples of bottom-up mechanisms towards better accountability in development, many of which are enabled by growing access to communications and technology.  Ingredients of this revolution include:

• social accountability movements such as Twaweza (listen to Rakesh Rajani interviewed here)
• giving cash to people in developing countries, for example through cash transfer programmes
• giving people vouchers for services, and letting them choose where they get that service from
• Advance Market Commitments, which reward firms for producing goods and services of value

Oddly, many of these efforts to empower the poorest to direct resources themselves are opposed by some people working in development who regard themselves as progressive.  It is hard to escape the feeling that this opposition may owe more to concern for their own job satisfaction than for the interests of the poor.

It is not a straight choice between top down and bottom up accountability: there are hybrid models.  An important trend in development assistance over the last decade has  been efforts to encourage greater accountability of developing country governments to their own citizens, so that aid given to governments is better used in the service of the poor. This is a big part of the thinking behind the combination of budget support and Poverty Reduction Strategies.   Creative ideas are now emerging for strengthening the feedback loop from the intended beneficiaries of aid programmes to the overseas decision makers (such as ALINE and Guidestar), so combining top-down selection with bottom-up information about effectiveness.  These long chain accountability mechanisms are important, but they seem to me to be a second-best to giving poor people themselves direct influence over how resources are used.

Conclusion

Complex systems become and stay effective through a process of evolution: this requires variation and selection.  The development system contains quite a bit of variation, but not enough selective pressure.  Proposals for more effective top-down selective pressure should be supported, but the real prize is finding better ways to increase selective pressure from the people whom these programmes are intended to support.

This is very good stuff (and particularly commendable for the concise way it is written, without any of the usual development-speak).  I am particularly pleased to see transparency and predictability as the first two items.

I would add three things.

First, “reduce reliance on US contractors” is an anaemic recommendation.  The US should follow international best practice and untie all its aid.  In particular, the way the US and EU dump their surplus food in developing countries, driving local farmers out of business, is a disgrace.

Second, a quick way to improve the effectiveness of scarce aid resources would be to spend more money in the poorest and most populous developing countries.  Less than 40% of total aid is spent in less developed countries. Just shifting aid to the countries that need it the most would make a big difference to the impact of that aid.

Third, Congress needs to stop with the earmarking which is a huge driver of inefficiency in US foreign assistance.  Perhaps it is implicit in the final recommendation (make plans in the country, not in Washington) but it needs to be explicit.  The Bush administration did a pretty good job of preventing Congress from imposing earmarks on the MCC; this approach should be extended to the rest of US foreign assistance.

What are examples – some realized and some on the table but untested – for practical action in the interests of global prosperity? Where do good ideas come from? How do they get translated into action?

Nancy’s ten:

1. More AMCs for vaccines and green technology
2. Protect some aid from security and political objectives
3. Independent evaluation agency
4. More representative G-20
5. Visas for people from poor countries
6. Duty free, quote free access to all markets
7. Per capita distribution of net income from non-renewables
8. Reform of selection of heads of international agencies
9. World Bank to have a global public good window
10. Petrol tax in the US

Ever fizzing with ideas, Nancy throws in a few others: endow think tanks in low-income countries; increase capital at development banks; Climate Investment Funds to bring private investment money;  Cash On Delivery Aid; new insurance and risk management instruments at the multilateral development banks.

Well I agree with all those, of course (and not just because I’m a visiting Fellow at CGD!).   She asks for other suggestions.  Here are my ten:

1. Global standards for transparency and traceability of all aid to increase accountability and effectiveness
2. Climate justice – every person in the world to have equal, tradeable, carbon emission rights, capped overall at the level scientists tell us is safe
3. Global information sharing among tax authorities to prevent tax evasion
4. Unbundling of aid funding from aid delivery, complete untying and global standardised output and outcome indicators to enable cost comparisons
5. A global minimum income guarantee backed by cash payments to the world’s poorest people
6. Product traceability from sweatshop to supermarket using barcodes
7. A complete ban on exports of small arms
8. A standing, professional  UN peacekeeping force to be deployed by a reformed Security Council
9. Reform of intellectual property to permit free access in the lowest value markets
10. Increasing the share of aid to LDCs from 38% of global aid today to 90% by 2012.

Update 25 February: On Twitter, Nancy Birdsall (@nancymbirdsall) says: “@OwenBarder has 3 more actionable ideas (and 7 dreamy ones)”.  This is a good game: which of these does Nancy think are actionable and which are dreamy?  My guess is she thinks (1), (3) and (9) are actionable and the rest dreamy.   But what do you think?

I think they are all realistic – but then I’m with John Lennon: “You may say that I’m a dreamer, but I’m not the only one. I hope some day you’ll join us, and the wo-o-rld will live as one”.

The Times criticizes the Conservative Party for their commitment to maintain the planned increases in development spending. The leader recycles discredited assertions about the negative effects of aid rather than offering solid analysis.  There isn’t a single reputable econometric study showing that aid causes harm through  exchange rate appreciations, corruption or slowing progress to democracy.   Peter Bauer, whom the leader article quotes, was criticising Cold War foreign assistance programmes which bear little resemblance to aid programmes today. Aid today is increasingly practical, targeted and measurable, just as The Times says it should be, and it works.

Britain was one of 147 countries which pledged we would “spare no effort” to meet the Millennium Development Goals. As The Times implies, we should not be judged on what we spend but on what we achieve. On this basis we are not yet doing enough to achieve the goals to which we are committed.  That is why it is important that Britain should continue to increase its world-class development programme, and press other nations to increase their spending too.  To resist this on the grounds that 0.7% is an arbitrary figure is a clever-sounding point for a debating society, not a reasoned argument against the commitment of all the main political parties to meet Britain’s international promises, and to press other countries to do the same.

From the other end of the political spectrum, Kevin Watkins in The Guardian seems to be determined to use development to score party political points – and to do so he has had to put himself in the strange position of arguing against the country-led approach to development which is supported by all main UK political parties.

Under the Labour Government Britain has helped build an international consensus that aid works best in support of a country’s own development strategy; that policies imposed from outside rarely work; and that governments should be accountable to their own citizens for their policies and actions.  Kevin Watkins rightly supports these points in other contexts. Yet he apparently won’t entertain the idea that other countries may have different views from his (and mine) about the best way to organise and fund public services.

I’ve read the Conservative Green Paper and it does not call for state services to be rolled back in developing countries. It says that governments should guarantee access to education for all their people; and that donors should fund that guarantee and support and encourage governments to choose whatever path enables them to expand education provision fast and effectively.  It does not propose or advocate market-based solutions in education: it says explicitly that the Conservatives would work with the public, not-for-profit and private sectors.

Kevin Watkins quotes the Green Paper saying “We bring a natural scepticism about government schemes“; this is the entire basis of his claim that “the Conservatives will use aid to roll back the state in key services“.  But it is clear when you read this sentence in context that the Conservatives are questioning the role of the government in aid, not planning to tell other countries how they should manage their public services.

There is now a valuable cross-party consensus on the need to use aid money to support countries’ own development priorities and programmes.  The challenge today is how to bring public sector reform to the aid business – including the possibility of some market-like disciplines to make aid more effective and accountable.  There are proposals in both the Government White Paper and the Conservative Green Paper to make aid more transparent and accountable and to link it more closely to results. Kevin Watkins might have used his space to tell us what he thinks about these ideas instead of trying to score party political points on development.

(By the way, I admire Kevin Watkins, but I’m not comfortable with the fact that a UNESCO official, paid from public funds, is using his position to make highly partisan and inaccurate attacks in the newspapers on the main UK opposition party. )

I’ve got no party political axe to grind: my interest is in supporting the best possible policies to accelerate development, so that the world is a fairer, happier and safer place for everyone.  It seems odd that the Conservatives should be attacked from both left and right for articulating development policies which seem to me squarely in the mainstream of development thinking.

The cross-party consensus that the UK’s development budget should continue to increase, and that British development policy is amongst the most effective in the world but nonetheless there is room for improvement, should be a matter of shared national pride, not scorn and sniping from whichever direction.  Let’s sustain that consensus, and not allow development policy to be used as a political football even in the heat of an election campaign.

Update: see Kevin’s reply in the comments.

The consequence is that you have to invest time and money in generating that feedback; and you have to extract that information from the communities where you work in a relationship that verges on exploitation.  At the thin end of the wedge it may be nothing more intrusive bringing your visitors to a school and expecting a welcome ceremony – perhaps some songs by the children and a shared meal under an acacia tree.  Towards the thick end of the wedge it means talking up poverty, using words like “famine” where it might not be appropriate.   And it means asking children and adults to prostitute themselves by writing letters of gratitude to their sponsors.

Here is a description of a charity “Doing a world of good” that sends money to Ethiopia

… World of Good was born six years ago.  It’s a simple concept: For $25 a month, donors sponsor children chosen by an organization Asmare runs in the city of Gondar, at the base of the Simien Mountains in the northern region of Ethiopia. It differs from programs such as Save the Children in that the money goes directly into an individual child’s supervised bank account, instead of being pooled with other sponsors’ money and used for community projects.

When I started to read about World of Good, my first impressions were favourable.  Giving money directly to children to use as they wish sounds like an empowering and progressive approach.  But as I read more I become uneasy, and then quite nauseous:

Reerslev and Gerdes made a pact not to open the letters to sponsors without each other present. When the box finally gets here, the two find a place and a time to sit together, reading each one, making sure the children are not asking for specific things or making a plea to be adopted, which is forbidden by the charity’s rules. Mostly, the two women just read, and cry. They parse through heartbreaking stories of children whose parents have died from starvation or AIDS, who have quit school so they could walk into the dangerous forests on the outskirts of their ramshackle villages to gather cow dung or timber for firewood, who have been too busy trekking miles to the nearest water well to spend time learning to read. … One girl, Tigist, lost both of her parents and, before she joined the program, was a 12-year-old trying to survive completely on her own, eating out of trash bins. She wrote letters to her sponsors that said, “You are my family,” “You are my guardian angels.” Tigist, who is now 17, just graduated from technical school.

This is poverty porn.  The children are asked to write letters, but the letters have to be censored to make sure they don’t go too far (we are happy to send you money but you must under no circumstances ask to come and live in our country).  The children write letters praising their sponsors as angels.

This is not only wasteful of time and effort, especially of the time of the poor, it is degrading to those involved.  Why should children be forced to write letters describing their lives in return for money to eat or have an education?

My indignation is not reserved for the people at “Doing a World of Good”, who doubtless mean well.  I understand why they feel they need to do this: it helps them raise money and that in turn helps them to make a difference. Their behaviour is the result of a broader problem, with the citizens of rich countries, who seem to be unwilling to sacrifice a tiny part of their income to help a fellow human being unless they feel some sort of personal connection with the recipient.   This is charity of a Dickensien sort: not a system of social justice and protection, but throwing some coins to a beggar in the street and expecting to be lavishly thanked.

Quenching the apptetite for poverty porn is rational for each charity, NGO and aid agency: that is what they need to do to survive; but it is socially harmful.  We have to work harder to convince the public to make contributions without the titillation of letters from children or logos on lorries, but based on systematic and rigorous evidence of the difference that their contributions are making.

I’m glad that Duncan and Chris, his Oxfam colleague,  endorse a key argument of the paper, which is that the development industry will improve through evolutionary change rather than grand design; and that a driver of this change will be better mechanisms feedback from the citizens of developing countries about what is working. The paper points out that this kind of evolutionary change comes from variation and selection – and that the aid business does not have enough of either to ensure evolution towards more effective aid.

Duncan and Chris  have reservations about the word “beneficiary” to describe the people in developing countries whom aid is intended to support.  I think that is a good point, and I’d be happy to use a different word if we can find a suitable alternative (I don’t think that “primary stakeholder” or “rights holder” takes the trick, since neither is sufficiently specific about who we mean).

I don’t want to put words in Duncan’s mouth, but I detect from his review that he is more sceptical than me about the value of markets. He dismisses without much fanfare the  the idea of giving more choice to the, er, “intended beneficiaries” (aka primary stakeholders and rights-holders):

Where I think he is wrong is a largely market based philosophy for creating incentives based on New Public Management theories of expanding choice more than voice. … This in turn requires some quite fundamental organisational change with in aid agencies, as well as establishing more citizen to citizen links possibly using new social media.’

That is an unfair characterisation of my view: I am in favour of choice AND voice.  A large part of the paper, especially when talking about networks, is precisely about how citizens can have more voice, and I talk explicitly about citizens links through new social media.  But there are huge problems to overcome in achieving this, because the “intended beneficiaries” are geographically and politically remote from decision-makers in aid agencies, which means their voice is dimly heard, if at all.

While I agree with Duncan on the need to ensure that people have voice, I find it surprising that he (in common with many people who regard themselves as progressive) is so reluctant to give choice where possible as well.   Duncan’s (excellent) book is called From Poverty To Power – and I believe that giving people direct control of resources and allowing them to choose what services they want, and from whom, can be one of the most important ways of empowering people.  Duncan calls this a “technocratic/new labour enthusiasm for using market mechanisms” – but the idea of giving the poor more direct control of resources goes back long before New Labour:  Oxfam’s honorary President, Amartya Sen, got a Nobel prize for his 1982 book, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation, which argued that it would be better to give people money than food in a famine.

I have not swallowed the New Public Management story hook, line and sinker, but I do believe that there have been positive experiences (for example, from the publication of league tables, and the distinction between purchaser and provider).  While I think we should learn from new public management, my paper describes in some detail the shortcomings of a market-only approach, especially as it relates to foreign assistance.  I hoped my paper would be an elegant synthesis of some of the best (and proven) tools of this school of thought with lessons from other approaches, especially the use of complementary mechanisms of networks, voice, regulation and planning.

The aid industry has almost entirely evaded the reform of public services over the last decade.   There is no measurement of results; no distinction between purchaser and provider; no customer choice.  Presumably the lack of reform is partly because the shortcomings of the industry are felt by people with no political power or voice in the political systems of donor countries. The incumbent service providers are politically powerful, well organised, and deeply conservative about any change that affects their interests.  The aid system has, over time, drawn to it people who are sceptical about the value of markets and choice, saddling developing countries instead with five year plans and long coordination meetings.  No politician in a donor country is enthusiastic to take on these vested interests, in order to improve services for people they will never meet and who have no vote in the election.

Linking aid more closely to results is attractive from many different perspectives.  My own view is that linking aid directly to results will help to change the politics of aid for donors. Many of the most egregiously ineffective behaviours in aid are a direct result of donors’ (very proper) need to show to their taxpayers how money has been used.  Because traditional aid is not directly linked to results, donors end up focusing on inputs and micromanaging how aid is spent instead, with all the obvious consequences for transactions costs, poor alignment with developing countries systems and priorities and lack of harmonisation.  If we could link aid more directly to results, I think donors will be freed from many of the political pressures they currently face to deliver aid badly; and it would be politically easier to defend large increases in aid budgets.

Other people support Cash on Delivery aid for other reasons.  Ministers and officials of developing country governments see it as a way to access more money without the attendant costs of conditionality and foreign interference in domestic policy.  Some people see results-based aid as a way to restore the accountability of developing country governments to their own citizens, a social contract in which aid donors too often inadvertently interfere.  Especially in the US, some people believe that linking aid to results can create stronger incentives for developing country governments to deliver high quality public services.  Others support Cash on Delivery because it will improve the allocation of aid resources, since money flows to the places where services are being delivered and away from the places where money is being wasted. With all these complementary reasons there appears to be the possibility of a broad coalition of people in favour of moving ahead with testing whether Cash on Delivery aid can work in practice.

But there is one group of people for whom these ideas seem to be quite unsettling: development professionals in aid agencies and NGOs.

I recently wrote a response to a brief by CAFOD about some possible concerns about Cash on Delivery aid.  As I was doing so I realised that the questions asked by some development professionals reveal some discomfort about the possible impact of results-based aid on the quality and content of their jobs.  The “risks” identified in the CAFOD brief are not primarily about the consequences for development but rather risks to the privileged position enjoyed by professional staff in aid agencies and NGOs.

You can judge for yourself whether I am caricaturing the risks set out in the CAFOD paper, but they essentially amount to this: under Cash on Delivery aid money would flow to those governments best able to make use of it; governments would have freedom to decide which services to provide and to whom; governments would be able to decide how to use resources; governments would be accountable for their choices and the results; and progress would be measured according to internationally-agreed targets for impact rather than inputs and intermediate targets negotiated behind closed doors.

All these are necessary steps towards the internationally-agreed agenda for more effective aid set out in Paris and Accra, and necessary for the emergence of capable, accountable and responsive states.  Yet when a mechanism is proposed that tries to organise the aid system in a way that means these things could start to come about, these consequences are described as “risks”.

At the heart of these anxieties, it seems to me, is a question about what sectoral advisers in aid agencies are meant to be doing.  Take education advisers, for example (I am not picking on this group in particular, but it happens that the current proposals for Cash on Delivery aid are being developed looking specifically at education.)  Many people who work for aid agencies managing aid programmes for education are themselves education professionals, often former teachers.  Deep down (sometimes also on the surface) many of them want to be educators, not managers of aid programmes.  They want to be involved designing the curriculum, reforming the pedagogic approach, training the teachers, buying textbooks, or improving the education management information systems.  But it is the job of a community to educate its young, not foreigners.  As managers of aid programmes the staff of aid agencies should be ensuring that aid is delivered in ways that increase the accountability of central and local government to the nation’s citizens, keeping transactions costs to a minimum, delivering aid in ways which support the evolution of country systems and priorities, ensuring that the money is used for the purposes intended by the funders, and showing what results have been achieved.

In short, managers of aid programmes should be focusing on the effectiveness of aid, not education policy.  If governments need technical advice on education, they can procure that separately, and get advice from people who are more trained to build capacity and who are properly accountable for doing so, not get it as a bundled free offer-that-they-cannot-refuse from the people managing their aid.  If it works as intended, Cash on Delivery aid would change the relationship between donors and governments and would turn development professionals back into aid managers instead of would-be educators.  And it is this consequence which, I believe, some people find unsettling.

Many of my best friends are development professionals, and I know that everyone who works in development (well, nearly everyone) has the interests of the poor at heart. They often genuinely believe that they need to retain a degree of  influence to ensure that developing countries make the kind of progress towards development that they (and I) want to see.  There is quite a close parallel with the evolution of the attitudes of politicians, some of whom I also know well and have known since they were young, idealistic students.  Nearly all politicians enter politics for the noblest of motives: to contribute to the improvement of the society in which they live.  To a very large extent they retain those values through their political career. But over time there can be a gradual erosion of the distinction in their minds between their own interests and the service they give to others: some politicians gradually come to think that increasing their own power is the service of others, because they believe that they will exercise that power better than anyone else.

Politicians are, of course, at their most dangerous when they can no longer distinguish their own interests from the interests of the people they are meant to serve.  Similarly we should be concerned when we hear development professionals identifying themselves as speaking for the poor, and arguing that they must retain influence (i.e. power) – purchased by the relative wealth of their country – to promote strategies which the country would not pursue on its own.

To be fair, I also know some development advisers who are focused on improving the effectiveness of aid, who are rightly aghast when they are asked to double up by providing advice on how to manage an education or health system.   If I may be permitted a partisan aside, my observation is that DFID sectoral advisers tend to be more respectful of the need to promote effective country systems for policy-making and accountability than professionals from some other donor organisations (both NGOs and official aid agencies), and they are less likely to interfere in the country’s policies and strategies.

This may seem like an elaborate point to build from an innocuous and fairly sensible CAFOD brief about Cash on Delivery aid.  But the risks identified by CAFOD, and the questions that have been raised elsewhere, would apply to any system of results-based aid that makes substantive progress towards giving governments more freedom to choose how to deliver their development programmes and making them more accountable to their own citizens for their own success and failure.   I think these concerns actually reveal a deep-seated tension between the internationally-agreed agenda for improving aid effectiveness, and the views and interests of development professionals charged with designing and implementing those reforms in practice.

The Conservative Party have said in their Green Paper on international development that they will pursue this approach if they form the next government in the UK. They say:

We will link aid directly to independently-audited evidence of real progress on the ground. Increasingly, we will pay ‘cash on delivery’: giving an agreed amount to a recipient government for every extra child they get into school or every extra person who receives decent healthcare. This will give British taxpayers confidence that their aid money is buying specific successful outcomes.

In October, CAFOD published a briefing note about Cash on Delivery aid which is a helpful summary of the proposal, and is also a useful compilation of some questions that have been raised about the idea.  It lists nine “risks” of Cash on Delivery aid which it says should be addressed.

I have written a response to the CAFOD brief which addresses each of the nine risks in turn.  I regard nearly all of the issues raised by CAFOD as features, rather than risks, of Cash on Delivery aid.

You can download my response to CAFOD here (pdf).

Some supporters of aid have made what seem to me to be extravagant claims that aid should aim to bring about economic and social transformation of developing countries, so accelerating economic growth and industrialisation.  But this is a very high bar to set.  Aid may well help to increase the probability of economic take-off but there are lots of other conditions that need to be in place for the transition to an industrialised market economy to happen, and aid is not a sufficient condition (nor, probably, a necessary condition) for it to occur.   Even if aid does play an important contributory role, it would be statistically very hard to demonstrate a link between aid and economic growth.

Although the effect of aid on economic growth is uncertain, there can be no doubt that aid makes a huge difference to people’s lives.  Aid provides food, health care, education, clean water, financial services, and modest incomes which transform the lives of the people who receive them.   You can see this both in individual families – like the girl I met in northern Amhara, pictured here, who has health care and education because of aid – and in the overall statistics, which show that there has been a vast improvement in the quality of life on almost every measure other than income.

Aid may not always transform societies, but it does enable people to live much better lives while those transformations are taking place.  And that represents a huge increase in the sum of human welfare.

I believe aid could and should work much better.  Living in a developing country, I see all kinds of waste and inefficiency in the aid system that makes me angry. But it makes me angry because I also see how much difference aid makes when it is used well.  I would like to see aid becoming much more transparent and accountable, so that it becomes subject to evolutionary pressures to improve.

This means, by the way, that I do not subscribe to the view that the aid system should be regarded as temporary.  In the UK we hope that people will be on unemployment benefit temporarily before they are able to get back to work, but we don’t expect the system as a whole to come to an end.  So I think that we should expect that at least for our lifetimes, it will be right and necessary that we transfer income from the richest people in the world to the poorest people in the world.  I do not know which countries will be rich, on average, in fifty years time, and which will be poor; but I expect that the world will still need, and I hope it will still have, a permanent system to help those temporarily in need wherever they happen to be.

Aid would work better in future if we accept that we will need a permanent system to provide temporary help to those who need it, and set about designing a better system to do that.

Read the full article here.

Related reading:

• Phil Vernon at openDemocracy (to which my article was a reply)
• Roger Riddell at openDemocracy
• Ranil at AidThoughts
• Chris Blattman – Could Aid Slow Growth

I’m not a fan of these aid-growth regressions, because they are technically difficult to do well (see David Roodman’s article on the problems.)  But they are important for one reason: they are a more systematic way of doing the popular “folk regression” offered by authors such as Dambisa Moyo and Bill Easterly.  When Moyo and Easterly point out that countries that have had high levels of aid have also suffered from slow growth, they are implicitly pronouncing on whether there is a statistical relationship between aid and growth.  But of course you would expect to see a lot of aid going to poor countries (rather as ambulances tend to be present at the scene of road accidents)  so these simplistic comparisons do not tell us very much about the effect of aid on growth. The more careful question to ask is whether, other things being equal, aid leads to higher or lower growth, and that is what this kind of statistical analysis investigates.  It is good to have confirmation that the folk regressions are wrong and that aid does, as best we can tell, lead to economic growth.

There are a few other interesting things about this paper:

• the paper uses the same data as the infamous and oft-cited Rajan and Subramanian paper which claimed that there was no effect on growth (which I criticised at the time here) and finds that, if the regressions are done more carefully, those findings were not correct;
• the effect of development aid on growth is probably understated by this analysis because it includes all aid (unlike the paper by Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavnani, which subtracts humanitarian aid and other aid which is not intended to lead to economic development and finds – as you would anticipate – much larger effects of aid on growth from the subset of aid that is actually intended to promote development);
• there is no sign of diminishing returns to aid in this analysis. (This is an unusual finding – generally studies have needed to include a diminishing returns term to generate a statistically significant relationship between aid and growth).
• the study uses donor-specific fixed effects (the only study to do so, as far as I am aware). I’m looking forward to looking at these in detail, as the estimates will give us an insight into which donors are the most effective.

(h/t Chandan)

Update: David Roodman, whom I regard as an authority on these matters, thinks that I am wrong and Bill Easterly is right.

What I especially like is that this analysis does not focus only on aid.  Too often, we measure the extent of our international solidarity by the amount of aid we give, and not by all the other important things that rich countries do (or don’t do) which affect developing countries at least as much as – probably much more than – giving them money.

Apologies for parochialism, but I was struck that the UK has fallen this year from 6th place to 12th place, out of 22 countries.   David Roodman, the uber-geek (and I mean that in a good way) who designed and runs the index, said this:

“The U.K.’s aid giving slowed in 2007, the latest year for which complete data are available, while its exports of arms to undemocratic regimes such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia ticked upward.”

The UK scores in the Commitment to Development Index are depressed by the index’s judgement that there is insufficient rigor in tackling corruption by UK firms operating overseas, a high level of arms exports to undemocratic and poor countries, high agricultural subsidies, tight controls on immigration from the poorest countries, and restrictive intellectual property laws on plant types and data.

Officials from other  countries sometimes think the UK is a little too pleased with itself about development.  I wonder if they will think that, now that UK finds itself in the bottom half of the league table, having been overtaken by six countries (New Zealand, Spain, Australia, Austria, Finland and Canada), the UK should focus a little more on how its own policies affect the developing world.

I’m envious of Tim’s ability to  express the ideas so much more succinctly and clearly than me.  He writes:

it might be easier to change the rules of the game to encourage real competition than to change behaviour

That’s my argument in a nutshell.

Tim also writes:

if you imagine a Howard Schultz of Starbucks attempting to “harmonise” the world coffee-bar industry, you can see how idiosyncratic the harmonisation agenda actually is.

In the paper I argue that more planning and coordiation among donors will not overcome the political constraints that prevent better aid.  The aid system is in a political equilibrium which we need to try to change; we won’t solve aid’s problems by trying to move away from the equilibrium.  This means making more use of market and network mechanisms to change incentives within the aid system. We need to stop thinking of grand new designs of the aid system and start putting in place mechanisms that force evolution in the right direction.

I’ve listed a set of measures, from the commonplace (untying aid, for example) to the unusual (tradable missions permits, or a tax on proliferation pollution) to illustrate the ideas.

I’ll be discussing the paper at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) on Friday, and on a forthcoming episode of Development Drums.

I’m looking forward to comments and feedback.

The World Business Report podcast is here.  The discussion about the Tobin Tax was in the edition for October 7th, 2009 – it will be there for a few days.  Alternatively you can download just the relevant part of the programme here.

The presenter, Mike Johnson, introduces the discussion by saying that James Tobin (a Nobel prize winning economist) proposed the tax as a way to finance efforts to combat poverty and disease. That isn’t true: James Tobin proposed the tax as a possible way to reduce speculative transactions.  The idea of linking the tax to development spending is a subsequent embellishment by campaigners against global poverty.  James Tobin said in an interview in Der Spiegel in 2001:

Ich habe nicht das Geringste gemein mit diesen Anti-Globalisierungs-Revoluzzern.

(My translation: “I have nothing at all in common with these anti-globalisation revolutionaries.”)

In Bangladesh, Adam Jackson has posted some interesting reflections on his visit to a health programme (in which DFID supports the government) and a Chars Livelihood Progamme.

Our health review team visited a District hospital where mothers who would never normally have access to safe delivery facilities had very recently given birth thanks to a voucher scheme funded by DFID and a number of other donors. Fifty miles away in the Chars I and the other workshop participants visited a village and met a number of women – some of the most vulnerable people on the planet – who had been given assets of their choice (typically a pair of cows) and had their homes raised on clay plinths above the seasonal flood level, as well as a range of other support to enable them to become self-sufficient. … Both of these programmes contribute to the Millennium Development Goals, and produce results that few people interested in the welfare of the poorest would argue with.

Adam makes the excellent point that both programmes work, albeit to achieve different kinds of objectives.  Working through Government may be slower and more uncertain, but in the long run it is an investment in Government systems which, in the end, Bangladesh will need as it becomes more prosperous and no long relies on foreign aid.  The Chars programme reaches people more quickly, but does not contribute to building lasting institutions.  Clearly, both programmes have an important place, and donors need to be better at understanding that we are working towards multiple objectives and need many different types of instrument.

We need to understand better than we do: (a) how much immediate development benefit do we give up, if any, and how much institutional improvement do we gain, by working through governments? and (b) can providing services through parallel channels such as NGOs actually do harm to the long-run evolution of national institutions, for example by hiring away skilled staff, or by reducing the focus on and accountability of government institutions which should, in the long run, be playing those roles?

Adam’s call for rigorous, transparent evaluation is welcome. I would add that it should be independent and more focused on impact and less on process than current evaluation.